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I. INTRODUCTION
Brazil's computer market is the fastest growing in the world, 1 with computer
sales becoming, in 1994, the largest in Latin America.2 The direct corollary to
growth in the computer industry is the increased reciprocal demand for software
applications? Yet, in Brazil, the majority of consumer demand for software has
been satisfied historically by the illegal reproduction, or piracy, of the desired
software.4 In 1993 over eighty-nine percent of all software in Brazil was the
product of piracy,5 a minimal decrease from the ninety-one percent level of 19A.
In 1994 Brazil improved significantly their piracy rate by reaching a historic low
level of seventy-four percent.7
The high rate of computer software piracy does not reflect an absence of
legislation in Brazil. To the contrary, the 1987 Software law provides the judicial
means, at least on paper, by which software publishers may combat violations of
their product copyrights." This law provides for fines,9 as well as criminal
1. Scott Norvell & Ian Katz, Infotech Revolution, U.SJLAXIN TRADE, May 1995, at 73 [hereinafter
Norvell & Katz]. See infra notes 157-170 and accompanying text (discussing Brazilian growth generally, and
the technology markets specifically, as the fastest growing in the world, oulpacing both Western Europe and
North America).
2. J. P. Farber, Computer Fever, U.SJLATIN TRAD., Sept. 1994, at 11 [hereinafter Farber]; James
Brooke, Brazil Luring Computer Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6. 1994, at sec. 1, p.33, col. 3 [hereinafter
Brooke] (stating that Bill Gates, head of Microsoft, predicted that Latin America would become his company's
fastest growing market in the second half of the 1990s). Microsoft is planning to start assembling software
products at a new plant in Brazil. Brooke. In July of 1994, Microsoft signed a US$20 million contract with
a Brazilian bank to test its software on an automatic teller machine. Id. Cf. Lenilson Ferreira, Brazil is Magnets
for American Investment, JAPAN ECON., Newswin, Feb. 16, 1995 (reporting that many U.S. multinational
firms are turning their investment activities to Brazil as they pull their money out of the Mexican market
following the current Mexican currency crisis).
3. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Steinhardt, Corporate Attorney for Latin America, Microsoft
Corporation, President, Latin American Business Software Alliance, Jan. 11, 1995 [hereinafter Steinhardt
Interview 1/11195].
4. See infra notes 171-187 (discussing the alarmingly high rate of illegal reproduction of software
applications in Brazil).
5. Software Groups in Brazil Threaten LegalAction to Halt Piracy, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 552
(Apr. 6,1994) (quoting Manoel Perirados Santos, lawyer forthe Brazilian Association of Software Companies
and counsel for the Business Software Alliance in Brazil); see infra note 185 (discussing piracy rates estimation
methodology).
6. See infra notes 172-173 and accompanying text.
7. PC Sofvare Industry Lost $8.08 Billion to Pirates in 1994: Piracy Rates in the U.S. Declines,
Software Publishers Association, News Release, Feb. 24, 1995 (providing a global overview of piracy rates
and piracy losses to the software industry); Elisabeth Malkin, Turning the Cannon on Mexican Pirates, BUS.
WY-, Oct. 24, 1994, at 20 (reporting that Brazil accounts for the largest amount of revenues lost to software
piracy).
8. Brazilian Law No. 7646 of December 18, 1987,51 LEx 904. translated in 27 I.L.M. 993 (1988).
9. Id. art. 35. Where the number of illegal copies or rate of illegal acquisition is unascertainable, the
fine to be imposed is equal to 2000 copies in addition to those seized. Jeffrey D. Steinhardt & Richard H. Neff,
Author's Rights in Latin America, 34 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 117, 127 (1994).
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penalties of up to two years imprisonment for software copyright violations. 0
The 1987 Software Law, created and passed by the Brazilian legislature to avoid
threatened U.S. trade sanctions," is again under scrutiny in the Brazilian Con-
gress.'2 Additionally, concern over Brazil's protection of software copyright has
found recent expression within diplomatic relations between Brazil and the
United States."
This comment discusses the changing nature of Brazil's treatment of software
copyright in light of the country's historical perception of intellectual property
rights. Part II outlines the Brazilian understanding of intellectual property rights,
including the history, development and U.S. influence behind Brazil's current
software protection legislation.1 4 Part III presents the demographics of the
Brazilian software market and discusses the important economic and political
changes recently experienced in Brazil under President Fernando Henrique
10. Microsoft Wins $10 Million Award in Software Piracy Case in Brazil, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1376 (Aug. 18, 1993) (awarding Microsoft damages from a major Brazilian computer manufacturer, Prologica
Microcomputers, who had sold unauthorized versions of Microsoft's popular Disk Operating System (DOS)).
Prologica installed the software directly onto the computers they manufactured. Ld. Prologica claimed the
application, which they labeled S0-16, was independently created. Id. Microsoft attorney George Fischer, a
Slo Paulo high technology attorney, stated that "it is impossible to write a sophisticated operating system
without spending money." Id. An audit of Prologica's records, ordered by the court, revealed that the company
had spent no money on research and development. Id. Microsoft's victory was only the second ever judicial
decision in favor of a foreign manufacturer of software against a local Brazilian violator but the largest ever.
Id.
11. Maria Ines Bastos, How International Sanctions Worked: Domestic and Foreign Political
Constraints on the Brazilian Informatics Policy, 30J. DEv. STANDARD 380,384 (1994) (noting demands by
the U.S. government for the dismantling of Brazilian protectionist trade policy to restore most-favored-nation
trading status and fairness in international trade). Between 1985 and 1989, the United States threatened to
impose commensurate trade barriers upon Brazilian exports to the United States. Michael Boyle, Brazilian
Software Law: Building A Domestic Industry While Opening a Protected Market, 24 INTER-AM. LAW R. 281,
293-97 (1992). Fueled in part by Brazil's lax stance on protecting intellectual property rights, namely of foreign
manufactured products, threats of U.S. trade sanctions were lifted with Brazil's passage of the 1987 Software
Law. Id.
12. Brazil To End Market Reserve, Reduce Duties On Computer Goods, Softvare in 1992, 7 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1483 (Sept. 26. 1990) (announcing Brazil will terminate its formal protectionist trade barriers to
foreign manufactured computer technology as well as begin drafting changes to the 1987 Software Law). See
Brazilian President Proposes Program To Modernize lndustries, Investment, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 363,
Mar. 6. 1991 (discussing the continuing legislative proposals to revamp intellectual property laws). U.S.
Groups Call on Latin America To Bolster Patent, Copyright Protection, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 127, Jan.
27, 1993.
13. See, e.g., Shapiro Tells PanelAdministratlon Will Give Special 301 Fresh Direction, 10 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 648, Apr. 21, 1993 (threatening trade sanctions by U.S. Trade Representative that were similar
to previous Brazilian Super 301 actions). USTR Fact Sheet on Special 301 ReleasedApril 30, 1993, 10 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 726, May 5,1993 (discussing those countries which the Clinton administration has resolved
to take strong measures against to ensure that U.S. trading partners provide adequate and effective protection
of intellectual property rights and comparable market access for relevant U.S. products, specifically singling
out Brazil). USTR Announces Tennination of Brazil Special301 Investigation, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 344,
Mar. 2, 1994 (ending a nine month investigation as a result of the Brazilian legislature's announcement that
it will seek the passage of improved intellectual property legislation by June 15, 1994).
14. See infra notes 19-156 and accompanying text.
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Cardoso and their effect upon the Brazilian computer software market. 5 Part IV
reviews proposed changes to current software copyright legislation resulting from
international agreements, as well as alternative methods of protecting software
copyright.16 Part V concludes that Brazil, as the largest expanding software
market in the world, must direct its attention towards increasing the level of
protection afforded software copyright to sustain the current levels of growth in
the informatiC17 markets.
18
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMBNT OF BRAZILIAN SOFrWARE COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION
A. Brazilian Perception of Intellectual Property Rights
1. Intellectual Property Protection as a Restraint on Competitive
Markets
Intellectual property rights occupy a unique position among the myriad of
Brazilian economic and commercial concerns. Intellectual property in Brazil is
dichotomous by nature; it is both a natural right of the creator to be protected
from the rest of the world, 19 as well as a restraint upon economic, industrial, and
social progress.20 The Brazilian system for intellectual property protection is
15. See infra notes 157-226 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 227-290 and accompanying text.
17. Eg., Boyle, supra note 11, at 292-297 (examining Brazil's refusal under the market reserve created
for Brazilian informatic companies by the Brazilian Congress to license Microsoft, Inc.'s MS-DOS in the
country). This refusal heightened U.S. attacks and threats to force Brazil to create a modem, workable, and
reasonable computer software protection legislation. Id. The word "informitica" in Portuguese results from
the association of two different words: "informagoa" (information) and "automtica" (automatic) are used to
designate all activities related to information processing. Id. Thus, "informatics" means the science that deals
with processes of communication between men and machines, as well as the activities involving or resulting
from these processes. Rodriguez Casella, supra note 19, at BR-3.
18. See infra notes 291-303 and accompanying text.
19. Adrianna Camargo Rodriguez Casella, Brazil, in CompTrER SoFTWARE PROTECTION LAW DR-I,
BR-5 §201.1 (Cary H. Sherman et al. eds., 1991) (discussing applicability of copyright law to software for
purposes of protection in Brazil). Recognition of intellectual property rights as those unique to its author or
creator are known as "author" or"moral" rights. Steinhardt & Neff, supra note 9, at 117. This is in opposition
to sui generis protection of intellectual property rights which is a protection regime unique to the domestic
legal system perpetrating such protection and not following traditional methods of protection. Id. Author's
rights, derived from the French model droit de auteur, focuses upon the moral rights of the creator or innovator
and his right to exploitation of the work. Id.
20. See infra notes 22-29 and accompanying text (presenting the popular Brazilian governmental
understanding that protecting intellectual property rights inhibits competition by granting a de facto monopoly
to the owner of the rights); cf. China, Turkey, India, Brazil Faultedfor Inaction on Intellectual Property, BNA
INr'L TRADE DAILY, Feb. 15, 1995 [hereinafter China, Turkey, India, Brazil Faulted for Inaction on
Intellectual Property] (recognizing Brazil's determination not to protect adequately the intellectual property
rights associated with pharmaceuticals).
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based on 19th Century European code provisions relating to copyright and in-
dustrial protection.21 These antiquated notions of intellectual property are mixed
with statutory innovations eliminating protection in selected areas that are of post-
World War II vintage.2
Protecting intellectual property rights has, from the first intellectual property
cases decided by Brazil's Federal Supreme Court, been viewed as contradictory
to promoting competitive markets. 4 By recognizing an individual's exclusive
right in his work, a government grants that individual a monopoly regarding the
exploitation of that work?8 The grant of a monopoly in one's work is viewed as
detrimental where the creation is of high social utility?6 Brazil, like most
developing countries, broadly defines intellectual property rights. 7 In addition,
Brazilian policymakers contend that Brazilian companies do not have the
expertise or technical capabilities to compete equally with superior foreign
companies. 8 Thus, the ultimate goal of achieving competitive markets becomes
unattainable when far superior products are introduced into the Brazilian market.
Domestic industries, incapable of competing with the foreign manufacturers, be-
come effectively excluded from their own national marketplace? 9 A far superior
21. Robert M. Sherwood. A Microeconomic View of Intellectual Property Protection in Brazilian
Development, in INiELLECTIUALPROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ECONOMICPERFORMANCE
113, 114 (1990); cf Wolf Brueckmann, Intellectual Property Protection in the European Community, in
INTELuEcruAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 291 (1990)
(explaining current developments in intellectual property protection in the European Community (EC), namely
computer programs and databases, and the EC's common position of accepting GATI).
22. Sherwood, supra note 21, at 114.
23. DuRVAL DE NORONHA GOYOS, JR., DICnoNARIO JURfDICO NORONHA: INGItS-PORTUGUts E
PORTUGUtS-INGLtS (1994) (defining Supremo Tribunal Federal as Brazil's Federal Supreme Court).
24. Newton Silveira, Propriedade immaterial e concorrencia, 300 REVISTA FORENsE 69 (1987) (Ana
Paula Rago Villi trans.) (discussing the concept of intellectual property protection as creating an effective
monopoly in the protected proprietary interest through the analysis of historic Brazilian federal cases).
25. But see, Steinhardt & Neff, supra note 9, at 121 (1994) (contending that the negative effects of
technology monopolization more than offsets the contribution of stronger intellectual property protection
toward stimulating cost-saving innovations in a given country).
26. See Steinhardt & Neff, supra note 9, at 118 (discussing exceptions to an author's exclusive right
to control his creation in recognition of society's interest in gaining access to the work for beneficial purposes).
27. See Richard Nicholas Brown, The Little Recognized Connection Between Intellectual Property and
Development in Latin America, 22 INT'LREv.OFINDUS. PROP. &COPY. L: IC 348 (1991).
28. Sherwood, supra note 21, at 113.
29. Flavio Grynszpan, Case Studies in Brazilian Intellectual Property Rights, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 99, 107 (1990) (analyzing
Brazilian legislative decisions which deny intellectual property protection in pharmaceuticals to defend the
interests of the Brazilian drug industry which does not have the research and development capabilities to
compete with multinational firms). Traditional justifications for the protection of copyright are advanced
through four separate arguments. LAuRA N. GASAWAY & SARArt K. WANT, LmRARIms AND COPYRIGHT: A
GUMETO COPYRIGHTLAWS IN'THE 1990s 157 (1994). The first is a natural rightjustification where the author
is entitled to the fruits of his labor. Id. Second, because it takes a considerable amount of investment, both in
time and labor, to create innovative works, an incentive must be provided for such creators to be compensated
and reimbursed for their work. Id. Third, an innovative creation may be seen as a cultural asset with protection
of the creation benefitting the public interest Id. Fourth, while the rights of the innovator or creator must be
379
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concern to Brazilian policy makers involves creating and maintaining employ-
ment for Brazilian citizens, as opposed to protecting the profits that are trans-
ferred to foreign companies.30
In an effort to provide local businesses the opportunity to compete with
foreign companies, intellectual property rights are not effectively legislated or
judicially enforced, thereby allowing the free use of otherwise protected crea-
tions?' But while government officials, lawyers, businessmen, and economists
alike argue.that the costs of not permitting adequate intellectual property pro-
tection may be great, the costs of correcting such inadequate protection are even
greater?.
Brazil fails to notice its vast potential to create locally innovative, creative
and unique processes and designs?3 One example is Brazil's development of
banking software?4 Prior to the introduction of the new Brazilian currency, the
Real,35 high inflation deflated quickly any deposit of cash in one's account. A
misfortune for Brazil as a whole had actually helped its software industry. For
years, Brazil's inflation demanded that banks be able to transfer money and
balance accounts instantly, otherwise, they would lose a fortune on the float.
United States banks normally require a week to process and clear an out-of-state
check; Brazilian banks perform this task instantaneously. The software to manage
these transactions is mainly Brazilian and it has stimulated a variety of networks,
financial and other sophisticated systems, that match the best in the world.
respected, it must be balanced with the needs and reasonable demands of an organized society to have access
to the creation. Id.
30. Telephone Interview with George C. Fischer, a partner with the Sgo Paulo law firm Fischer &
Forster, President ofthe Brazilian Computer and Telecommunications Law Association (ABDI) (Jan. 16, 1995)
[hereinafter Fischer Interview] (stating a Brazilian misconception in protecting intellectual property rights as
being exclusively for protecting profits rather than viewing such protection as beneficial to the national good).
31. Claudio R. Frischtak, The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and Industrial Technology
Development in Brazil, in INTE.LECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN ScIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 61, 62-64 (1990).
32. Sherwood, supra note 21, at 114; but see Steinhardt& Neff, supra note 9, at 121 (citing research
by David M. Gould and William C. Gruben discovering that strong intellectual property protection encourages
innovation resulting in economic prosperity).
33. Sherwood, supra note 21, at 114 (stating that strong intellectual property laws which restrain illegal
reproduction of innovations and creation benefit not only the govemment's coffers, but also assists in the
transformation from pirate to legitimate enterprise). The authors point to Singapore as an example. Id. "Once
Singapore's copyright laws were strengthened in the mid-1980s, former pirates who had been copying audio
cassettes and selling them, ceased this activity, and many moved to the manufacture of blank cassettes to serve
the local market and to export." :d
34. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Steinhardt, Corporate Attorney for Latin America, Microsoft
Corporation, President, Latin American Business Software Alliance, Sept. 11, 1995 (stating that one of the best
examples of Brazilian ingenuity has come from their development of software allowing bank customers to do
all their banking at home) [hereinafter Steinhardt Interview 9111195].
35. See infra notes 212-226 and accompanying text (examining the new Brazilian currency and its
affect upon the computer industry).
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Brazilian banks are also using new software to allow their customers to bank
at home? 6 Where in the past the customer would have to remit all payments for
utilities, phone, and credit in person at the bank, now these payments can be made
over the computer lines via fax or telephone connections with modems. Cash
withdrawal is the only service a bank customer must leave his house to enjoy.
2. Intellectual Property Violations as a Cost of Doing Business
The violation of intellectual property rights in Brazil does not evoke any
domestic public response demanding strong enforcement of current lawsY7 The
Brazilian attitude towards such violation is that there is little, if anything, to be
gained from protection and enforcement ana that any protective action *ould
have a minor effect in preventing future violations.38 The majority of intellectual
property violations result from trade-secret infringemente9 which, in Brazil, are
viewed as a cost of doing business 0
36. Steinhardt Interview I/I 1/95, supra note 3 (explaining that Microsoft is entering into joint ventures
with the Brazilian banks employing such revolutionary software as home banking is becoming one of the
largest software markets yet to be tapped).
37. Frischtak, supra note 31, at 73-74; see Piracy One of Many Software Issues, Corporate Legal Times
(June 1994) (quoting Paul D. Carmichael of Apple Computer Inc., as saying that computer software piracy is
not really a question of corporate culture but really a question of culture). On college campuses, for example,
pirating software is de rigeur for the acquisition of computer software, as is the duplication of audio tapes, and
this mentality carries over into the workplace. Id. It is almost impossible to enforce software piracy laws at the
user lever. Id. Therefore, there is a cultural aspect going on as far as the persuasiveness of copying, which
carries over into the workplace, where it is practical to enforce the laws about software piracy. Id.
38. Frischtak, supra note 31, at 73-74.
39. Identification of Priority Foreign Countries, 58 Fed. Reg. 26991 (May 6, 1993) (stating that Brazil
does not provide adequate protection for trade secrets). Frischtak, supra note 31, at 61-66. Trade-secret
violations in Brazil occur where an employee of company A produces, with the company's resources and
capital, a design or innovation, then Company B hires the employee away at a higher salary or the employee
starts up his own company to exploit the new creation. Brown, supra note 27, at 358 (explaining the "gypsy
career" dilemma presented to Latin American companies seeking to acquire foreign technology through
licenseships). Because employee relations are viewed as a contractual relationship where the creations of one's
own mind are exclusively the creator's own, inhibiting the exploitation of one's own creative energies is
against natural law. ri Thus, trade secret violations, the main vehicle for intellectual property rights violations,
are viewed as a cost of doing business. Id.
40. See 58 Fed. Reg. 26991 (May 6, 1993), supra note 37. See Sherwood, supra note 21, at 113, 116.
The gypsy career is viewed as a cost of doing business in Brazil. Id. at 122-23. The situation occurs when
technical employees aspire to learn the technology of a company so as to position themselves to be hired away
by competitors at attractive salaries. Id. This practice increases salaries as companies seek to both attract and
retain skilled employees. it. The need to "go it alone" reflects an unwillingness to trust others with knowledge
of the innovation or creation. Id. Their lack of confidence in the ability of Brazil's intellectual property system
to protect their innovations and subsequent refinements and developments leads them to choose the solitary
approach. let Additionally, these researchers are not trained to run small businesses thus increasing the
possibility for failure to an already risky undertaking. Id. What occurs is individuals best suited to researching
and developing new technologies are devoting their time to keeping their small business afloat; an endeavor
they are not suited for, forcing them to sacrifice those endeavors where their abilities lie. Id.
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Interviews conducted by Robert M. Sherwood, a noted author on Latin
American intellectual property issues, with Brazilian business leaders, govern-
ment policy makers, attorneys, and scientific researchers uncovered surprising
results highlighting Brazilian unwillingness for protecting more strongly intel-
lectual property rights.41 The constant theme throughout the interviews was that
most companies lost their proprietary technology through key technical em-
ployees hired away by competing firms offering higher employee salaries. 42
Mr. Sherwood's questions as to what could be done to avert the misap-
propriation of technology were met with one of three responses:
First, [the interviewees] assumed that the loss is an unavoidable cost of
doing business. Second, they checked with their lawyers and confirmed
that nothing can be done given the present state of the law, particularly
regarding trade secret protection. Third, they assumed that departing
employees always have the right to carry out any information they
learned while employed with their firm."3
The perceived inability to guard against the illegal acquisition of intellectual
property M is further enhanced by inadequate administration of existing intellectual
property rights legislation. Administration of the Brazilian intellectual property
system is characterized by both extended periods of severe budget restraint, which
leads to poorly qualified personnel at the technical levels in the National Institute
of Industrial Property (INPI), as well as INPI policy decisions denying or cur-
tailing protection in specific areas'
41. Sherwood, supra note 21, at 114. Robert Sherwood performed research in Brazil from 1988-1990
interviewing over 120 businessmen, scientific researchers, venture capitalists, research park directors, selected
officials from government agencies, academic economists, think tank researchers, and lawyers. Id at 113. Half
of the interviews were with businessmen from Brazil's largest companies, but included small-to-medium sized
firms. Id. The interviews were with people from throughout Brazil. Id. Mr. Sherwood inquired about the full
spectrum of intellectual property, including trade-secrets, copyrights, patents, and trademarks. Id. The research
was supported by the National Science Foundation and the U.S. Section of the Brazil-U.S. Business Council.
Id.
42. Sherwood, supra note 21, at 116.
43. Id.
44. Frischtak, supra note 31. at73. Brazil's judicial system does not provide effective enforcement of,
or a deterrent to, infringements of one's intellectual property rights. Id. at 73-74. Judicial proceedings tend to
be slow and the courts are reluctant to impose prisons terms or grant adequate damages. Id. In Brazil,
intellectual property right infringement does not elicit any public response demanding stronger enforcement.
Id.
45. Sherwood, supra note 21, at 114.
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3. Brazil's Failure to Equate Vigorous Intellectual Property Rights
Protection with Economic Growth
Brazilian policymakers fail to connect economic growth to the protection of
intellectual property rights. The best and possibly only affordable hope for Brazil
to progress towards achieving a vibrant economically developed country is
through the use of modem technology.46While technology does permit lower cost
of production of both qualitatively and quantitatively superior goods, it is also
relatively simple to acquire illegally.47 Thus, absent effective legislation or
enforcement of intellectual property laws, the incentives for local companies to
innovate and create, rather than pirate, are nonattendant. s
While the Brazilian perception of intellectual property rights may be
accepting of violations, the costs created by such violations do not go unnoticed.49
Brazilian businesses are reluctant to allocate significant resources to internal
company research and development because of the potential loss of research
finding its way to its competitors. 5° Because of insufficient private commercial
allocation to research and development, Brazil remains, innovatively speaking,
a static environment in many vital industrial sectors.51 Further, lack of private
funding for research and development within companies leads to a major eco-
nomic loss, in terms of companies failing to develop new and improved products
in Brazil. 52 Because most intellectual property violations result from trade-secret
46. Brown, supra note 27, at 349; see also Steinhardt & Neff, supra note 9, at 119 (hypothesizing that
copyright industries possess the ability to contribute greatly to national economies and employment opport-
unities when examining the role played in copyright industries in other regional and national economies).
47. Brown, supra note 27, at 349.
48. See generally Michael L. Doane, TRIPs and International Intellectual Property Protection in an
Age ofAdvancing Technology, 9 AM. U.J. Ir'LL &POL'Y465 (1994) (addressing the dilemma of a domestic
innovator who, without receiving proper compensation for his efforts, finds no reason to engage in the effort
to create the innovative product).
49. Software Piracy Poses Global Threat; New SPA Study Urges Increased Government Attention to
Enforcement in Foreign Markets, PR NawswutE (July 5, 1994) (putting the software piracy problem into
perspective, thieves last year stole as much business software as McDonald's sold hamburgers by comparing
that a total of U.S.$7.4 billion of business software was pirated and McDonald's sold U.S.$7.3 billion); see
also Sherwood supra note 20, at 115 (citing Edwin Mansfield, Protection ofIntellectual Property Rights in
Developing Countries, unpublished (1989)); see generally Eileen Hill, Strong IPR Protection is Importantfor
High-Tech Trade; Intellectual Property Rights, Bus. AM., Aug. 1994, at 23 (reporting that when
representatives of high-technology companies are asked about their most valuable assets they uniformly answer
that it is their firm's intellectual property).
50. Sherwood, supra note 21, at 117.
51. Id. Evidence drawn from a questionnaire on the technological performance of the Brazilian industry
from a 1980-81 sample of 4309 industrial firms with 7156 plants showed that 67% ofrespondents believed that
copying of product lines from competitors is a common practice in their sector. Frischtak, supra note 31, at76-
77.
52. See also Susan Athey, Would the Sofn'.,are Police Find Your Company Guilty, 45 . OF SYSTEMS
MGMT. 32 (1994); Sherwood, supra note 21, at 117.
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infringement,5 3 businesses are reluctant to expose too much of their work force
to innovative and advanced technology. Thus, employees lack the synergy and
essential training within the manufacturing units and research groups that is
required to promote efficient technological advancement.
The effect of Brazil's perception that intellectual property violations are a
legitimate cost of doing business seriously impinges upon acquisition of foreign
technology through licensing. A director of a Brazilian business will not have the
incentive to compensate a foreign company in exchange for a license to utilize the
technology because the same technology will be copied illegally by domestic
competitors at no cost.5 Enthusiasm to acquire through licensing agreements the
superior foreign technology is often thwarted by fears of economic loss through
trade-secret violations.5 6 This inability to protect foreign licensed technology
often precludes the foreign company from licensing such technology to the local
Brazilian firm. 7
Brazilian business' failure to recognize or respect intellectual property also
affects the venture capitalist side of Brazilian business. Venture capitalists cite
that relatively few small-to-medium-sized technology companies are being
formed.58 First, only a small number of people seek to begin a new company.
Second, of those that do decide to start a new company, the new business owners
are reluctant to provide the venture capitalist with sufficient information about the
company's proposed technology to allow for a responsible analysis in deciding
whether to lend money.59 Also, lack of adequate judicial enforcement of intel
53. Sherwood, supra note 21, at 116.
54. Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property Tights and the GATl A View
From the South, 22 VAND. . TRANSNAT'L L. 243, 254 (1989) (writing that the conventional reasons for
intellectual property rights protection include promoting investments in research, development, and tech-
nological innovation and encouraging the disclosure of new knowledge).
55. Sherwood, supra note 21, at 125.
56. Sherwood, supra note 21, at 117. Mr. Sherwood's research revealed that Brazilian businesses are
reluctant to fund licensing agreements with foreign technology sources. Id. at 126. "Although... it would be
more cost effective to learn from the foreign source than to pursue the technology by conducting internal
research, they found it was usually a waste of their time even to initiate discussions with the foreign supplier."
Id. Businesspeople understood well the reluctance of foreign suppliers to risk placing valuable technology into
the Brazilian legal and economic environment only to have it lost by an employee offered higher pay to work
for a competing firm. Id.
57. Contra Braga, supra note 54, at254 (stating that the conventional reasons for intellectual property
protection are not enough to make an economic case for the adoption of intellectual property laws because there
are other institutional arrangements what would generate the same result of the concession of legal rights in
new knowledge).
58. Sherwood, supra note 21, at 123.
59. Sherwood, supra note 21, at 122. Venture capitalists prefer to examine about 100 candidates before
selecting the four to five worth investing in. Id. at 123-24. Also, the applications received for financing provide
only scant information about the technology on which the new company will be based. Id. The applicants are
reluctant to disclose detailed information about the new technology because they fear that the knowledge will
be taken by others. Id Venture capital firms considered offering agreements guaranteeing confidentiality, but
then realized that they were powerless to provide assurances that such agreements would be binding on the
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lectual property violations leaves the owners and directors of Brazilian businesses
without incentive to borrow funds to invest in research and development
B. U.S. Influence Behind Passage of the 1987 Software Law: The Brazilian
Super 301 Case
From September 1985 until October 1989, the U.S. and Brazilian govern-
ments were engaged in a trade conflict based on Brazil's protectionist informatic
industry. This conflict was precipitated by the Brazilian government's failure to
provide effective legislation to protect computer software from unauthorized
reproduction, 61 as well as Brazil's resistance to opening their markets to foreign
competition. 62
Throughout the 1980s, the United States reacted to the problem of inadequate
intellectual property protection in foreign countries by enacting a variety of do-
mestic and international legislation. The U.S. Congress, in a move to strengthen
actions taken under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,63 created the Super 301
action." Super 301 allows the President of the United States to investigate alleged
venture capitalists' employees. Id. Mr. Sherwood mentions that a secretary could easily copy the application
then hand it "out the back door" to others. Id. Current Brazilian laws are ill suited and incapable of preventing
such occurrences. Id.
60. Sherwood, supra note 21, at 122.
61. Bastos, supra note 11, at 380 (emphasizing the effectiveness of sanctions in promoting policy
changes in Brazil through economic losses as well as creating a balance of political support for the policy
within Brazilian society).
62. rd.
63. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988) (allowing the seizure and destruction of goods infringing upon U.S.
intellectual property rights).
64. 1974 Trade Act § 301,19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982) (authorizing U.S. imposed trade sanctions upon
imports from foreign countries found to be engaging in unfair trade practices to the detriment of U.S.
concems).
The "Special 301" provisions of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, require the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) to determine whether the laws and practices of foreign countries deny
adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights or fair and equitable market access
for U.S. persons who rely on intellectual property protection. The USTR must identify for the
President "priority foreign countries" upon which to potentially impose trade sanctions. A "priority
foreign country" is a country that:
I. has the most onerous and egregious acts, policies and practices which have the greatest
adverse impact (actual or potential) on the relevant U.S. products, and;
2. is not entering into good faith negotiations or making significant progress in negotiations to
address these problems
If a country is identified as a "priority foreign country," the USTR must decide within 30 days
whether to initiate investigatory procedures of those acts, policies and practices that were the basis
for identifying the country as a "priority foreign country." A "Special 301" investigation is similar
to an investigation initiated in response to an industry Section 301 petition, except that the
maximum time for an investigation is shorter-6 months with the possibility of an extension to 9
months-as compared with the 12 to IS months permitted under a petition-based section 301
investigation.
USTR Fact Sheet on Special 301, released Apr. 30, 1993, supra note 13.
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foreign unfair trade practices and impose necessary trade sanctions upon the
infringing country.6 The unfair act, policy, or practice must cause a burden or re-
striction on U.S. commerce." Declaring that foreign violations of U.S. intellectual
property rights constituted unfair trade practices, President Reagan, through the
application of Super 301, imposed trade sanctions, pressuring Brazil to change its
treatment of computer software protection.6 United States complaints of Brazil's
computer software intellectual property regime evolved from a general claim
against protectionism in Brazil's information technology policy to a list of
twenty-six specific points.6 This created a narrowly focused agenda for nego-
tiations consisting of three parts: (1) administrative procedures, (2) market access,
and (3) intellectual property rights.6 9
1. Administrative Procedures
The first point of agreement reached between the United States and Brazil in
the Brazilian Super 301 Case was the administrative procedures through which
the United States would monitor Brazilian progress in the area of computer soft-
ware protection.7" According to the White House, U.S. President Ronald Reagan
decided to suspend this first part of the case because Brazil had made sufficient
progress on copyright protection for computer software7' In August 1986, the
Secretaria Especial de Informatica (SEI), Brazil's agency responsible for adminis-
tering the informatic policy, implemented internal reforms increasing the speed
65. USTR Fact Sheet on Special 301, released Apr. 30, 1993, supra note 13.
66. Judith Hipper Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Requirements,
Procedures, and Developments, 7 J. IN'L L.Bus 633, 633-34 (1986) (stating that the sole requirement under
Section 301 is that an act, policy, or practice of a foreign government or instrumentality be inconsistent with,
or deny the United States benefits under, a trade agreement). The USTR has traditionally interpreted "trade
agreement" to mean exclusively the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATF) or a trade agreement
approved under § 3(a) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 2503(a) (1982). Id. The trade
agreement portion has been narrowly construed because in any case involving a trade agreement, the USTR
is required to "promptly request proceedings on the matter under the formal dispute settlement procedures
provided" in such agreement. Id Many non-GATT agreements call for any dispute settlement to occur before
the International Court of Justice. Id The USTR contends that Congress did not "intend to require resort to the
World Court in trade disputes." Id.
67. June 30 Deadline for USTR Determination of Retaliation Against Brazilian Informatic Policy, 4
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 842, July 1, 1987. See infra notes 61-116 and accompanying text (outlining the main
events of the U.S. Brazilian Super 301 Case and its significant influence upon Brazil's implementation of
computer software copyright protection).
68. Bastos,supra note I1, at384.
69. 50 Fed. Reg 37608 (1986) (reporting the initiation by the USTR of investigation into Brazil's
informatics policy).
70. Bastos, supra note 11, at384.
71. President Suspends Copyright Part of Brazil Case, But Talks Will Continue on Investment, 4 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 867, July 8. 1987 (noting that Brazil's Chamber of Deputies in June of 1987 has been acting
in a manner that, according to the White House, adequately addressed U.S. concerns about software copyright
protection).
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with which it processed company applications for local manufacture and import
licenses.
72
In September 1990, the SEI approved a joint venture between IBM and
Gerdau, a Brazilian data-processing service. The following November, an inter-
national consortium of U.S. and Brazilian government officials was created to
analyze specific complaints reported by U.S. companies.73 Brazil's cooperation
with U.S. concerns was taken as a showing of good faith towards alleviating the
trade conflict between the two countries and resulted in the United States sus-
pending the first part of the "Brazilian Super 301 Case."74
2. Market Access
The level of market access U.S. companies were to have in Brazil's
informatic sector proved more difficult an area to negotiate. The United States.
vehemently contested Brazil's application of a market reserve for national
informatic companies which acted to the detriment of U.S. companies.
Brazilian informatic policies were designed with the sole purpose of estab-
lishing a national informatic sector to rival those of Asia and North America!5
The market reserve set aside various market sectors in which foreign competition
was effectively excluded? 6 The Brazilian informatic policy created broad
authority to restrict imports and reserve for Brazilian-owned firms the sole right
to manufacture and sell products within certain high-technology sectors.77The ex-
clusion of foreign competition was deemed necessary to provide total market
control for local Brazilian companies, thus destroying all obstacles to the creation
of a strong informatic market 8
The market reserve represented a point of nationalistic pride within Brazil's
government.7 9 However, in the United States, the opening of Brazil's informatic
72. Bastos, supra note 11, at 384-85.
73. Bastos, supra note 11, at 384-85.
74. 52 Fed. Reg 1619 (1986) (stating that on December 30, 1986 the President suspended those parts
of the investigation concerning administrative procedures).
75. See generally Dr. Antonio Chaves, Brazi in IN'L COPYRIGHTLAW &PRAcacE, BRA-1, BRA-23
(1988) (explaining that Brazil sought, with the implementation of its suigeneris computer software protection
law, to rid itself of its heavy dependence upon foreign manufactured software and all its colonial implications).
76. Industry Representatives Strongly Oppose Brazil's Informatics Policy, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
387, Mar. 18. 1987.
77. See 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 867, July 8, 1987, supra note 71.
78. George Charles Fischer, The Software Law, LAxT.AM.L.&Bus. REP. Sept 1994, at 8 [hereinafter
Fischer, The Software Law].
79. Fischer Interview, supra note 30 (explaining that Brazil sought to rid itself of the colonial
implications inherent in total reliance upon foreign manufactured technology, even though those products have
significant social utility).
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market to foreign manufactured products was imperative 1 At stake in these dis-
cussions was nothing less than the right of U.S. patent and copyright holders to
benefit from the technology created with their work, energy, and capital."1 The
United States ultimately compromised their hardline position to Brazil's
inadequate intellectual property protection upon receiving Brazilian assurances
that the market reserve for the informatic market would be in effect only until
19 92 a and that it would not extend to any other products.
8 3
3. Intellectual Property Rights
The heart of the U.S. "Brazilian 301 Case" focused upon Brazil's failure to
accord protection for computer software against illegal reproduction.84 The
Brazilian government's concern about the inadequate treatment of their informatic
industry led to the passing of the 1984 Informatics Law.8 The Informatics Law
created the market reserve through which Brazil reserved specific market sectors
exclusively for Brazilian businesses; however, it failed to address any level of
protection for software.8 A companion to the 1984 Informatics Law, Bill No. 260
of 1984, sought to extend a sui generis regime of protection to computer soft-
ware.87 The Informatics Law combined both patent and copyright law and was
under discussion when the United States began its Super 301 investigation. 88 This
changed the course of Brazilian legislation! 9
80. Administration Vote on Brazil Informatics Comes Under Congressional Fire at Hearing, 4 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 930, July 22, 1987 (quoting Representative James Florio (D-NJ) criticizing Brazil's market
reserve and stressing the importance for U.S. access to that market).
81. Id. (quoting Representative James Florio (D-NJ) during hearing debates on the administration's
activities with Brazil's informatic policy).
82. Brazil To End Market Reserve On Computer Goods And Sofnvare, 40 PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHTJ. 487 (Oct. 4, 1990) (emphasizing the Brazilian government's announcement that it will end its
market reserve policy on computer goods and software on October29, 1992).
83. 52 Fed. Reg 1619 (1986), supra note 74 (stating that Brazil's eradication of the market reserve by
1992 was a primary impetus behind the U.S. President suspending further USTR investigation into Brazil's
informatic policy).
84. Bastos, supra note 11, at 384,386.
85. Brazilian Law No. 7232 of Oct. 29,1984.48 L x CoLatATNEA DELEGISLAgAO BJUISPRUDENCIA
LEX534(1984).
86. Report on the Committee on Finance of the United States Senate on Investigation No. 332.318
UnderSection 332 of the TariffAct of 1930, Cr. F011Nr'LTRADE (June 1992) (outlining deficiencies in Brazil's
1984 Informatics Law).
87. See Chaves, supra note 75. at BRA-25 (writing that sui generis protection is law which is unique
in nature, not following traditional tenets of the regime for which it is offered, and uniquely established by the
legislating body). Id
88. Bastos, supra note 11, at386.
89. Id.
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The United States suggested to Brazilian negotiators that copyright law would
afford a more feasible regime for protecting computer softwareo In light of
Brazil's and the United States' signatory status to both the Universal Copyright
Convention 1 and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works,9 copyright protection would be easily adaptable to the protection of
software. 93 As a result of domestic governmental negotiation§, Brazil's National
Council for Informatics approved the use of a copyright regime for the protection
of computer software.9
In December 1986, Brazilian President Jose Samey presented proposed legis-
lation improving intellectual property protection for computer software to Brazil's
House of Representatives. 5 The House of Representatives approved the legis-
lation,96 which formally became law on December 18, 1987. 7 Specifically, the
law enunciated that copyright protection would be extended to computer soft-
ware.95
The U.S. acceptance of Brazil's 1987 Software Law was tepid at best. 9
Dissatisfaction with the 1987 Software Law centered around two provisions in
the new Brazilian law: maintaining the principle of similarity"° for foreign
90. 52 Fed. Reg. 4207 (1987) (reporting that the USTR was soliciting comments regarding, inter alia,
Brazil's lack of adequate copyright protection for computer software as well as Brazil's proposed copyright
and commercialization legislation), see Bastos, supra note 11, at 386.
91. Universal Copyright Convention oflune 19, 1970, 1 B.D.I.E.L. 811.
92. Berne Convention of September 9, 1886 For The Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1
B.D.I.E.L. 711 (Paris Text, July 24, 1971, as Amended) [hereinafter Berne].
93. See generally, Guy Burkill, Reverse Compilation of Computer Programs and its Permissibility
Under the Berne Convention, 6 COMP. L. & PRAC. 114 (1990) (explaining incorrect European Community's
assumption that the Berne Convention would tolerate virtual unmitigated reverse compilation of computer
programs by not distinguishing between uses for study and research and those of unscrupulous competitors
seeking an unfair competitive edge); A.D. Schuz, An Overview of the Berne Convention-Generally and in
Relation to Computer Programs and Semiconductor Chips, 9 CoMP. L. & PRAC. 115 (1993) (outlining the
Berne 'Convention's applicability to the protection of computer software, though computer software is not
specifically mentioned but is encompassed, though debatable, under "literary and artistic works").
94. Bastos, supra note 11, at 386; see infra notes 122-136 and accompanying text (discussing the
Brazilian govemment's difficulty in applying its national copyright law to the protection of computer software
within its borders). Negotiations over the issue were completed on August 26, 1986. Id
95. Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, U.S.I.T.C. 1995 [Part iof III] (July 1987).
96. Bastos. supra note 11, at 386.
97. Michael M. Krieger, The Brazilian Software Market: A Guide For Foreign Publishers, 6 CoMP. L.
& PRAC. 197, 197 (July/Aug 1990); see Brazilian Senate Sets 'Top Urgency' Debate on Software Law in
Response to U.S. Action, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1287, Oct. 21,1987.
98. Krieger, supra note 97, at 197.
99. See generally USTR Ends Four-Year Probe Of Brazil's 'Informatics' Policies, USTR Hills Says,
38 PAT, TRADEMARK & COpR1GHTJ. 631, 631 (Oct. 12, 1989) (quoting U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills
saying that while the new law is an improvement from previous inadequacies in Brazil's protection of software
and admittance of foreign software publishers into Brazil's informatics market sector, there is still a need for
improvements and negotiations will continue).
100. Fischer, The Software Law, supra note 78, at 7 (explaining that the "law of similars" test requires
that for a foreign manufactured computer software application to be allowed into Brazil it must not conflict
with a functionally equivalent program developed in Brazil by a company under local control (51% of voting
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manufactured software to be marketed in Brazil; and Brazil's extending only
twenty-five years of protection for software rather than the traditional fifty years
accorded other copyrighted works."'1
4. U.S. Imposed Trade Sanctions
After Brazil's passage of a comparatively innovative software law,'02 the
issue of market access for foreign manufactured software applications was still
left unreslved.'03 Brazil's insistence on applying the standard of "functional
equivalent!' as justification for disallowing foreign manufactured software into the
country proved to be the impetus to President Reagan's imposition of trade
sanctions."04
Although parts one and three of the "Brazilian Super 301" case had been
resolved, the issue of market access remained throughout the entire USTR
investigation.10 5 Brazil's refusal to license Microsoft's MS-DOS 3.2t in the
country on the grounds that a functionally equivalent locally manufactured pro-
duct existed increased U.S. dissatisfaction with Brazilian trade policies in the
informatic sector."m
The U.S. sanctioned, inter alia, Brazilian footwear producers, airplane
manufacturers and orange juice producers., The sanctions sought to equalize the
United States' US $105 million losses caused by Brazil's inadequate informatic
stock and management control held by local residents)).
101. Id. at 12 (interpreting the law of similars test as violative of Brazil's obligations under the Berne
Convention). The Berne Convention, to which Brazil is a signatory member, allows 25 years of protection as
the minimum for applied works. Id. Under Brazilian law, however, applied art works are protected only if their
artistic value is [disassociable] from their industrial nature. Id. It is difficult to fit computer programs into this
category. Ad.
102. Steinhardt & Neff, supra note 9, at 127 (stating that Brazil chose a sui generis Software Law in 1987
rather than protecting software under its copyright law).
103. Bastos, supra note 11, at 386.
104. Trade Sanctions ImposedAgainst Brazil, Statement (Nov. 13, 1987) in DE-T. ST. BULL., Jan. 1988,
at 60 (announcing Presidential intentions to raise tariffs on certain Brazilian exports to the United States and
prohibiting the Brazilian importation of specific computer products as a response to Brazilian exercise of unfair
trade sanctions in the computer products markets).
Brazil is a good friend of the United States, and we support the steps it is taking to restore its
democratic institutions. But Brazil is also a major beneficiary of the global trading system, the
openness of which cannot be maintained if markets are deliberately closed and policies
incompatible with a more free and open trading system are established.
ld. (quoting President Reagan).
105. Bastos, supra note 11, at 386-87.
106. 52 Fed. Reg. 44939 (1987) (seeking responses to Brazil's rejection of a licensing agreement
between Microsoft and six Brazilian informatics companies wanting to implement Microsoft's DOS
application).
107. Boyle, supra note 11, at 293-97.
108. 52 Fed. Reg. 44939 (1987), supra note 106 (providing an exhaustive list of all Brazilian products
upon which potential U.S. sanctions would be imposed in retaliation of Brazil's failure to implement adequate
protection of the informatic sector).
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market contro.1.' The Brazilian government responded by threatening to impose
sanctions of their own."0
President Sarney responded to President Reagan's announcement of trade
sanctions as an undue and discriminating threat that may bind U.S.-Brazilian
relations over a lesser matter.," Brazilian disappointment with President Reagan's
announcement of trade sanctions also arose from the fact that Brazil learned of
the White House list of Brazilian exports considered for retaliation through the
international press rather than through proper diplomatic channels." 2 Following
President Samey's statements, acting Brazilian Foreign Relations Minister Paulo
Tarso Flecha de Lima stated that wheat, coal, fertilizers and sulfur would be in-
cluded on a list of U.S. products upon which comparative sanctions would be
imposed."' In January 1988, the Brazilian National Council for Informatics
changed their previous decision, which had excluded Microsoft's MS-DOS 3.2,
and allowed Microsoft's later improved version into Brazil.'14 The U.S.
government responded by suspending its retaliatory measures in February 1988,
but continued its "Super 301" investigation of Brazil until October 1989, when
the "Brazilian Super 301" case was finally terminated.
115
C. The 1987 Software Law
On December 18, 1987, the Brazilian legislature enacted Law 7646/87,"6 the
1987 Software Law." 7 The Software Law represents Brazil's first attempt to
legislatively protect the proprietary rights of computer software" 8 A major
109. Brazil To Consider Retaliatory Measures Following U.S. Announcement of Sanctions, 4 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1419, Nov. 18,1987 (qualifying U.S. imposed trade sanctions upon Brazil as a result of estimated
US$105 million losses Brazil caused to U.S. businesses as a result of Brazil's inadequate maintenance of its
informatic market sector).
110. Id.
111. Id. (quoting Brazilian President Samey responding to President Reagan's threats as a product of
the de minimis problem of Microsoft not being able to market its MS-DOS 3.2 into the country).
112. Brazilian Informatics Council Meetings May Overturn Microsoft License Denial Decision, 4 Intl
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1451, Nov. 25, 1987.
113. See 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1419, Nov. 18,1987, supra note 109.
114. Bastos, supranote 11, at386. 1
115. Access to Brazil's Software Market Improved Under New Law, U.S. Executives, Officials Say, 6
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1077, Aug. 16, 1989, (reporting that the 1987 Software Law, approved in December
1987, opens access to Brazil's market). However, U.S. disapproval is still cited under the law's test of
similarity, which might exclude similar foreign products. Id.
116. Project of Law No. 8551-B, Didrio do Congresso Nagional, 1, June 23, 1987 (providing that Draft
Law 8551 established the foundation upon which the 1987 Software Law was built).
117. 1987 Software Law, supra note 8, art. II.
118. Casella, supra note 17, atBR-5 § 204.1.
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component of the 1987 Software Law is its utilization of a sui generisn 9 form of
protection rather than employing a more traditionally recognized copyright law. t0
1. Brazilian Reluctance to Afford Copyright Protection to Software
In Brazil, within governmental agencies and private companies, the protection
of computer software from illegal reproduction is a field of very recent interest. 121
The 1984 Informatics Law,'22 which is the Brazilian legislatures' call for the
National Congress to approve specific laws on issues relating to computer
software, failed to resolve the question of under what theory of intellectual
property computer software would be protected: patent, trademark, copyright,
trade-secret, or know-how. t2 This failure to address the appropriate regime
represented the general world-wide confusion over which was most appropriate
for protecting software.124
In the early 1980s, Brazil found itself among many other countries that did
not want to utilize copyright law for the protection of computer software.125 The
Brazilian government's reservations on extending copyright protection to com-
puter software were based upon three main political and economic reasons.
First, the term of protection should be compatible with the nation's level of
economic and social development.'6 The Brazilian government argued that the
length of the legal protection afforded by copyright law-the life of the author
plus sixty years-would be too long.12 Societal interests, the government argued,
demanded that the protection be limited to a shorter time so that, as occurring
119. Chaves, supra note 75, at BR-25.
Computer software is defined as "the expressions of an organized set of instructions in natural or
coded language, contained in a physical medium of any nature, for necessary employment in
automatic data processing machines, devices, instruments or peripheral equipment, based on digital
technology, to make them operate in a certain manner and for certain purposes."
1987 Software Law, supra note 8, art. Il.
120. See generally Steinhardt & Neff, supra note 9, at 126 (clarifying Brazil's non-application of its
copyright law for the protection of computer software). The system of protection of the intellectual property
of software is as established in Law No. 5988 of December 14, 1973 (The Brazilian Copyright Law) with the
amendments established by this Law to attend to the peculiarities of software. 1987 Software Law, supra note
8, at Title I, art. 2.
121. Casella, supra note 19, at BR-6.
122. Brazilian Law No. 7232, supra note 85.
123. Brazil: Law and Implementing Decrees on Software Protection, 27 1.L.M. 989, 989 (1988).
124. Boyle, supra note 11, at291.
125. Id.; butsee Casella, supra note 19, atBR-15 § 210 and BR-7 § 204.1 (noting that six months prior
to Brazil's passage of the 1987 Software Law the courts of So Paulo decided that computer software should
be protected by copyright principles).
126. Casella, supra note 19, at BR-7 § 204.1 (discussing applicability of copyright law to software for
purposes of protection in Brazil).
127. Fischer, The Software Law, supra note 78, at 6 (explaining the Brazilian government's disagree-
ment with protecting computer software vis-a-vis copyright law was that the duration of the protection, the life
of the author plus 60 years, would be too long).
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with inventions, the software may fall into the public domain.Irs Inventions
receive protection for a period of fifteen years because "new industrial products
and processes are considered to be of more immediate consequence to the
economic development of the country than works of a more aesthetic and cultural
nature."'29 Therefore, because software is of high utilitarian value to Brazil's
economic development and social structure, 3 its term of protection should cor-
respond with the interests and needs of the Brazilian people.
Second, the Brazilian government expressed fears that copyright protection
would not permit disclosure of the technology. 13 In the case of a designer of an
invention or creation seeking patent or trademark protection, such individual must
submit a descriptive report regarding the invention to Brazil's Patent and Trade-
mark Office. This obligation of the inventor is required so that once the product
falls into the public domain, the public will have adequate information upon
which to use, alter, or improve the creation.' -2 Under copyright law, the, software
publisher has no such obligation to give an explanation relating to the process of
development nor a description of the work itself.33 The effect this nondisclosure
practice might have, as argued by the Brazilian government, would be continuous
protection of the software well after it fell outside legal protection and entered the
public domain.134
Brazil's third reason for resisting the application of copyright law was that the
control over payment of royalties resulting from copyright is less strict, thus
leaving the government with diminished control.135 In Brazil, the Patent and
Trademark Office's exercise of control over copyright royalty fees is much less
domineering than with patents, trademarks and other technology. 36
128. Fischer, The Software Law, supra note 78, at 6 (specifying that the period for which inventions
are protected is 15 years).
129. Id.
130. Casella, supra note 19, at BR-I; Steinhardt & Neff, supra note 9, at 141 ; Doane, supra note 48, at
465.
131. Casella, supra note 19, at BR-7.
132. Fischer, The Software Law, supra note 78, at 6.
133. Fischer, The Software Law, supra note 78, at 6. Copyright law is extended to works of an artistic,
literary, or cultural nature. GASAWAY &WIANr, supra note 27, at 160. Computer software is included within
this group as a literaxy work. Id. Most countries find copyright protection for software under the guise of
software as a literiy work, a work of incematography, or within a catchall clause of a suE generis copyright
statute. Id
134. Fischer, The Software Law, supra note 78, at 6 (describing the Brazilian government's resistance
against applying copyright law to protect software because it would allow software to function as a 'black box,'
never allowing its technology into the public domain).
135. Casella, supra note 19, at BR-7.
136. Fischer, The Software Law, supra note 78, at 6.
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2. Sui Generis Protection of the 1987 Software Law: Unique Features
The Software Law's scope of protection is extremely limited to the specific
subject of computer programs 37 and operates under copyright principles adapted
to the unique requirements of computer software.' 38 Brazilian Copyright Law139
protects the authorship" t rights flowing from the creation of computer soft-
ware. 14 1 These authorship rights apply equally to nationals and foreigners alike,
as required under the Beme Convention 42 and the Universal Copyright Con-
vention. 43 Signatory countries to these conventions enjoy treatment under the
domestic law of any other signatory countries if reciprocal treatment is likewise
granted.'
4
Brazil's protection of computer software through its sui generis Software
Law' 45 treats computer software differently in comparison to other copyrightable
works.' 46 Most significant in the Software Law is the period of protection granted
to authors in their creations. The Law allows for the protection of computer
software for a term of twenty-five years beginning from the introduction of the
software in any country.' 47 This is not an adequate period of protection for
137. Casella, supra note 19, at BR-8 (stating that the protection of operating system programs is not
covered by the law and the Brazilian courts are the body which determines the scope of the protection).
138. Casella, supra note 19, at BR-7.
139. Brazilian Law No. 5988 of Dec. 14,1973.
140. 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT 676 (1989). To obtain relief against the illegal and unauthorized
use of one's creation in another country, U.S. copyright owners must establish that their work is entitled to
copyright protection in that country and that they own the copyright in that country. Id. Establishing eligibility
for protection under the copyright law of a foreign country will usually depend upon compliance with one of
four conditions. Id.
First, the author of the work must show he is a national or domiciliary of the foreign country.
Second, the author of the work in a national or domiciliary of a country with which the foreign
country has established copyright relations through a multilateral or bilateral treaty or through
proclamation. Third, the work was first published in the foreign country. Or fourth, the work was
first published in a country with which the foreign country has established copyright relations.
Id.
141. Casella, supra note 19, atBR-8. Authorship rights are granted to individuals from countries granting
reciprocal treatment to Brazilian authors in their country. Boyle, supra note 11, at 298. This occurs as a result
of Brazil membership as a signatory country to the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention.
Universal Copyright Convention of June 19. 1970, supra note 91. These conventions require the application
of the principle of national treatment. Berne, supra note 92, at art. 5(1); Universal Copyright Convention of
June 19, 1970, supra note 91, at awt- II. 1-2. This principle states that a country will protect the works of foreign
nationals on the same terms that it extends to works of its own nationals. GoI smw., supra note 140, at 681.
142. See Berne, supra note 92, at art. 5(l).
143. Universal Copyright Convention of June 19, 1970, supra note 91, at art. II. 1-2.
144. GOLDSrEN, supra note 140, at 681. This principle states that a country will protect the works of
foreign nationals on the same terms that it extends to works of its own nationals. Id.
145. Brazilian Law No. 7646 of Dec. 18, 1987, supra note 8.
146. Fischer Interview, supra note 30.
147. Brazilian Law No. 7646 of Dec. 18,1987, supra note 8, Title 1n, art. 3.
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computer software1 48 and is a glaring violation 14 of the applicable minimum
standards of protection required by the Berne Convention to which Brazil is a
signatory member."5
Also unique to the 1987 Software Law is its preservation of the market
reserve.'5 The requirement that a non-national software application be dissimilar
to a nationally manufactured application must be satisfied prior to its being
marketed in Brazil was met with fierce international opposition.152 Brazil's
application of the similarity test has proven effectively inconsequential to the
importation and marketing of non-national software applications in Brazil. 53 Less
than one percent of non-nationally manufactured software has been excluded
from Brazil's market because a similar national application exists.'-4 In October
1990 the Brazilian government announced that it would suspend the market
148. Steinhardt Interview 1/11/95,supra note 3. Subsequent revisions ofacomputerprogram may still
retain components of the earlier version. rd. Thus, if a later version of a program is released more than 25 years
after a component of the application was released, that component may be susceptible to reproduction without
the authors of the application receiving compensation for their efforts. Id.
149. Casella, supra note 19, at BR-8.
The (25 year) term of protection... is a glaring violation of the Berne Convention. Twenty-five
years is the minimum term ofprotection for works of applied art, which is a spiritual conception
that matches aesthetic and utilitarian elements. However, under Brazilian law, an applied art work
is protected only if its artistic value is separate from its industrial nature. Hence it is difficult to fit
software into this category.
Id.; but see, 2 LJ. KUTrEN, CompuTER SoFrwAatn PROTECiON, LiABILrrY, LAW, FORmS 11-45-11-46 (1992)
(finding that each country can decide for itself whether or not a computer program on magnetic media qualifies
for protection).
150. See Beme, supra note 92.
151. Brazilian Law No. 7646 of Dec. 18, 1987, supra note 8, at Title III, art. 8, para 2 (declaring that
admission ofa software application publishedby a non-national company is premised upon the determination
by the Special Informatics Office that there is no similar software developed in Brazil by a national company);
see infra. notes 190-197 and accompanying text (defining the Brazilian application of the market reserve in
an attempt to stimulate Brazil's domestic informatic market).
152. Brazilian Business GroupsAre Backing Same Changes In Infonnatics Lav U.S. Is Seeking, 4 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 198, Feb. 11, 1987 (quoting a report from the Brazilian Society of Computer Users
(SUCESU) saying that the SEI can deny a copyright registration on the vague grounds of national similarity,
and that such determination is extremely difficult and highly subjective, and this is generally an unacceptable
measure); see also 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 387, Mar. 18, 1987, supra note 76 (reporting the testimony of
William K. Krist of the American Electronics Association at the U.S. Trade Representative's hearings on the
Brazil 301 case and his disapproval of the market reserve because it harms both Brazilian and international
interests); 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1419, Nov. 18, 1987, supra note 109 (presenting U.S. disapproval with
Brazil's market reserve policy in the then proposed Software Law); 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1451, Nov. 25,
1987), supra note 112 (describing Brazilian Senator Roberto Campos' opposition to the Brazilian policy of
the market reserve in the informatics sector and his offering of a revised version without such regulations);
Industry Testifies On Brazilian Retaliation As Administration Moves Toward Sanctions, 4 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1590, Dec. 23, 1987 (presenting the American Electronics Association's opposition to the prohibition
of non-national informatic products upon a finding of similarity with a "similar" Brazilian product).
153. Fischer Interview, supra note 30.
154. Id.
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reserve policy on computer goods and software on October 29, 1992.55 However,
to date the policy still remains officially within the law' 56
'Ill. THE CURRENT BRAZmiLN SOFWARE MARKET
A. Software Market Sector Demographics
1. Brazil's Computer Market
In 1994 Brazil became, for the first time in its history, the largest Latin
American market for computer sales with 480,000 units sold. '57 Official estimates
place the total number of computers in Brazil between 1.5 and 2.5 million,' with
unofficial estimates ranging as high as 4 million 59 when including the number of
illegally imported contraband computers.' 6° Throughout the computer industry,
experts recognize Latin America, most notably Brazil, as the fastest growing
computer technology market in the world. 61
Between 1984 and 1992, the Brazilian government attempted to develop a
local computer industry that would compete with the United States and Asia' 62 by
implementing stringent import barriers to foreign manufactured technology.
63
This protectionist trade policy proscribed tariffs of up to seventy percent on im-
ported goods.164 Coupled with large importation taxes, computer prices were in-
flated four to five times' 6 those in the United States for similar products. The
Brazilian consumer was thus forced to choose between paying exorbitant prices
for foreign manufactured computer products or accepting outdated and overpriced
155. Brazil to End Market Reserve, supra note 82 (recognizing that the manufacture of personal and
mini-computers is still reserved exclusively for Brazilian companies). Brazil, lacking the manufacturing
capability to provide advanced mainframe computers, permits imports. Id.
156. Fischer Interview, supra note 30.
157. Farber, supra note 2.
158. Reese Erlich, Foreign Firms Flood Market Making Local Industry Reel, CHRISTIAN SCt. MONITOR,
Aug. 25, 1994 (stating that because of the large amount of contraband smuggled in every year to avoid taxes,
the exact number of computers in Brazil is uncertain).
159. Fischer, The Software Law, supra note 78, at 12 (stating that due to high tariffs and taxes, more
than 50% of microcomputers sold in Brazil are estimated to be imported through smuggling).
160. Fischer, The Software Law, supra note 78.
161. Norvell & Katz, supra note I (finding that in 1994, Compaq. Inc.'s sales increased by 100% in
Latin America, compared with 50% in the United States and 40% in Europe). Additionally, Compaq recently
opened a US$30 million c.omputer-manufacturing plant near the city ofJaguariuna, about 75 miles north.west
Of Se Paulo. Id.
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equipment manufactured by a handful of local companies who divided the market
among themselves. 1'
In the two years following the opening of its markets, Brazil has become the
fastest growing computer market in the world. 67 Brazil's packaged software
market is expected to rise by fifteen percent per-year until 1997, from US$829
million to US$1.5 billion. 68 In addition, software sales in Latin America are
growing at a rate three times that of North America and Western Europe.' 69 This
success is not expected to be short-lived in view of the number of multinational
technology firms concentrating their efforts toward Latin America and focusing
primarily upon Brazil.'70
2. Effects of Brazilian Software Piracy Upon U.S. Trade
Growth in the computer industry dictates an increased demand for software
applications.'7 1 Any economic benefit to be realized by software publishers from
a rapidly expanding computer market, like Brazil, must come from the legal
acquisition of their manufactured software by the market's consumers. In 1993,
the rate of legally acquired software in Brazil was only eleven percent. 72 Thus
eighty-nine percent of all software used on Brazilian computers was the product
of illegal reproduction or piracy.'7 In contrast, only thirty-seven percent of all
software in the United States was the product of piracy.' 74 While Brazil's per-
centage of legally acquired software in 1994 rose to twenty-six percent, this still
166. See generally Adrian Dickson, Brazilian Computer Show Fenasoft Opens, REuTERS, July 18, 1994.
167. Brooke. supra note 2. When compared to Japan, who had 12 million computers in 1993, it is
evident that Brazil stands to create impressive business possibilities for U.S.-based computer technology
manufacturers. Farber, supra note 2.
168. Also in the News, I1 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1253, Aug. 10, 1994.
169. See generallyAsia/Latin America Software Sales Growing, NEWSBYTFs NEWS NETWORK, Sept. 28,
1994.
170. NorvelI & Katz, supra note 1 (quoting Tod Rowe, Apple Computer's director of Latin American
marketing, as seeing a robust economy and a furthering of plans t6 increase Apple's position in the Brazilian
market). Apple expects to reach this goal by increasing sales in Brazil by 80% a year in the hopes of capturing,
by 1998, 10% of the Brazilian market). Trade Roundup: A Roundup of Important Trade News in the Americas,
U.SLATrN TRADE, July 1995, at 16 (reporting that Apple Computer expects to increase its market share in
Latin America). Apple's increase will be achieved by building business infrastructure in-country. Id. In Brazil,
for example, Apple opened a subsidiary this year and is developing business relationships with distributors,
warehouses and others trade intermediaries. Id.
171. Steinhardt Interview 1/11/95, supra note 3.
172. Software Piracy Poses Global Threat, SPA Press Release, July 5, 1994. The Software Publishers
Association is the principal trade association of the PC software industry. Latin America Sales Reach $41
Billion for Q3 1994: Doubling of Sales in Brazil Paces Growth, SPA Press Release, Dec. 19, 1994. The
association's 1100 members represent the leading publishers in the business, consumer, and education markets.
Id.
173. Worldwide Piracy $7.4 Billion in 1993, SPA Press Release, Mar. 28, 1994.
174. Id.
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falls well below the percentage of legally acquired software in many other
countries. 75
The costs of illegal reproduction to U.S. software manufacturers are best seen
when viewed in relation to possible total revenue. The Brazilian market potential
of revenues from legally acquired software in 1994 was estimated at between
US$800 and US$900 million.17 6 Revenues from sales of U.S. manufactured
software applications sold in Brazil for the first three quarters of 1994 were
US$24.2 million.1" Total sales for 1994 were $41.2 million, with the fourth
quarter alone generating US$16.9 million.178 When comparing total revenue from
U.S. publishers with total potential revenue, the difference appears staggering:
175. The figures listed below outline piracy rates and losses in other countries for 1994.
Piraey Losses
















PC Software Industry Lost $8.08 Billion to Pirates in 1994, supra note 7. See infra note 185 (explaining the
piracy rate and piracy loss estimation methodology).
176. 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 552, Apr. 6, 1994, supra note 5.
177. SPA Press Release, Mar. 28, 1994, supra note 173.
178. Latin America Software Sales Reach $152 Million in 1994: Doubling of Sales in Brazil Paces
Growth, SPA Press Release, Mar. 20, 1995.
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between US$780 and US$880 million. However, the Brazilian market is quickly
shortening the distance between the two figures.
In the first three quarters of 1994, total revenue from U.S. manufactured
software increased ninety-six percent from the same figure in 1993. '"Sales in the
third quarter alone increased 104 percent.' ° Comparable growth rates in the U.S.
and Canadian markets were only fifteen percent for the third quarter and eleven
percent for the first three quarters."it William H. Gates, President of the Microsoft
Corporation, predicted that in the second half of the 1990s Latin America would
become his company's fastest growing market.
182
Enthusiasm to profit from such growth must be tempered with the historically
widespread piracy of software in Brazil."' In 1993, eighty-nine percent of all
software used in Brazil was the product of piracy.ra This translates into U.S.
software manufacturers experiencing US$161 million in unrealized profits in
19945 as a result of Brazilian piracy of U.S. manufactured software applications.
179. SPA Press Release, Mar. 28,1994, supra note 173. Sales reported are from the SPA's International
Data Program, and represent total revenues in these regions of the 40 primarily U.S. based software firms
participating in the SPA's International Data Program. Id. The companies submit their confidential sales data
to the accounting firm of Arthur Andersen, which prepares the report for the SPA. Id. While U.S. companies
have the dominant market share in most of these regions, the figures reported should not be taken as an
estimate of market size. Id. Rather, they represent total sales of the reporting companies. Id.
180. SPA Press Release, Mar. 28, 1994, supra note 173.
181. Id.
182. Brooke, supra note 2. Microsoft, Inc. is a Redmond, Washington based software developer. 1994
Book of Listrs. Supplement to the Puget SoundBusiness Journal, PUGErSOuND Bus. ., 1994, at 34A. Microsoft
employs over 12,000 people and earned US$2.758 billion in total revenue from software development and
sales. Id. It develops programming languages, applications, software and operating systems for business,
education and home use. Id.
183. See supra notes 172-175 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 5.
185. PC Software Industry Lost $8.08 Billion to Pirates in 1994, supra note 7. Piracy Estimation
Methodology is as follows:
" SPA uses four sets of data:
I. Personal computer [PC] hardware sales, by year, and by market (International Data
Corporation).
2. P C business software sales, by year (SPA Data Program). The SPA analysis includes all
varieties of business applications- everything from word processors, spreadsheets, databases
and presentation graphics to e-mail clients, programming languages and tools, graphics and
desktop publishing packages, and utilities such as screen savers, and anti-virus packages. In
all, the SPA analysis includes sales from 25 types of business applications.
3. Arithmetic average cost per business personal computer software application (SPA Date
Program).
4. Average number of applications used per personal computer, by market (SPA and member
research and industry sources).
" One assumption:
None of the applications sold are sold to the installed base
" The analysis:
#business aoolications used. home = (home PC sales) x (# bus. app. per home PC)
# business apliations used, business = (bus. PC sales) x (# bus. app. per bus. PC)
#anlications ud= (# bus. app. used, home) + (#bus. app. used, bus.)
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Unrealized profit resulting from the piracy of U.S. manufactured software is
profit that has been stolen. 8 6 These losses can be detrimental to a company when
seen in relation to the immense amount of capital investment necessary to create
a software application.' 7
B. Recent Economic and Political Transformations
1. The Cardoso Administration
On February 15, 1995, Fernando Henrique Cardoso was inaugurated as the
President of Brazil on a pro-business, constitutional reform ticket'8 President
Cardoso is the first democratically elected president to follow the humiliating im-
peachment of Fernando Collor de Melho and only the second democratically
elected president in Brazil's history. Most notably among President Cardoso's
proposed policy directives is his intention to further open Brazil's historically
protectionist markets to foreign competition.'89
In the past, participation in the Brazilian computer marketplace was con-
trolled by the protectionist mandate of the government-imposed market reserve.190
The market reserve represented Brazil's attempt to stimulate the national eco-
nomy and industrial infrastructure by reserving for local businesses certain market
# applications pirated = (# applications used) - (# applications bought)
piracy loss = (# applications pirated) x (arithmetic avg. cost per application)
niracv Tate = (# applications pirated) I (# applications used)
The revenue loss figure of U5S161 million is only representative of losses of the software industry.
It does not include revenues lost to distribution channels or Value Added Tax (VAT) sales and
other taxes lost by governments, nor does it reflect losses to consumer application publishers or
publishers of operating systems.
Id.
186. Steinhardt Interview 1/1195, supra note 3.
187. Id. (explaining that included in a company's market research before investing capital into a program
is the amount of revenue to be realized from the particular targeted market). When a significant portion of the
market is receiving the benefit of a company's investment via the manufactured product without compensating
the manufacturer the company is in actuality losing money. Id.
188. Equity Forecasts 1995, EuRoMoimay, Feb. 1995, at 8; David R. Sands, South America's Economic
Bigfoot, Brazil, Steps Out of the Shadows. WASH. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1994, at A16 (quoting Alexandre Barros as
saying "[tihe vote for Cardoso endorsed capitalism and made it clear that the process of modernization of
Brazil is irreversible').
189. Brazil Makes the Right Call, U.SJLATINTRADF, July 1995, at 10 (explaining that the privatization
boom in Brazil has resulted in a major victory for President Cardoso as it allows him to keep campaign
promises of expanding the economy by attracting more foreign and local investment); Ricardo Silvagni, Brazil:
Why Now? The Rewards Outweigh the Risks, Most Savvy Traders Have Concluded, U.S. LATIN TRADE, July
1995, at 112 (outlining five points that multinational corporations must be aware of when making a decision
to go to Brazil, including the unstoppable trend toward economic reform in Brazil, President Cardoso and his
administration's commitment to implement much needed reforms, the impact of the Congress, and the public
support for the badly needed reforms to open the market to foreign competition). Id.
190. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text (outlining the Brazilian market reserve policy as it
was applied to the computer market).
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sectors in which foreign competition was, in effect, barred from participation.
191
Application of the market reserve to Brazil's informatic' 92 sector was done with
the intention of creating a local Brazilian computer industry to rival that of the
United States and Asia.193
Prices for foreign manufactured computer products became inflated four to
five times the prices of identical products sold in the United States.1 94 Coupled
with Brazil's poor intellectual property rights protection and the lack of foreign
competition, the Brazilian computer industry became static and the rate of new
developments fell behind those of Brazilian business' international counter-
parts.1
95
A solution to the problem of acquiring superior foreign computer products
at a reasonable price was found in the illegal and unauthorized reproduction, or
piracy, of the desired product, whether it be hardware or software. 196 This piracy
in the software sector has resulted in a societal attitude where presently seventy-
six percent of all software used in Brazil is the product of piracy. 197
The Cardoso Administration's current trade and import policies seek to
increase the opportunities of Brazilian consumers to enjoy the benefits a truly
competitive market confers by reducing the level of barriers placed on foreign
manufactured goods.198 Prior to his election as President in October of 1994,
191. Brazilian Decree Gives Preference to Locally Produced Computers, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 428
(Mar. 16, 1994) (reporting that Brazil utilized a market reserve for small-to-medium sized computers to nurture
and support a local manufacturing base).
192. Id.; see Krieger. supra note 97, at 197.
193. See 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 428, Mar. 16, 1994, supra note 193; Fischer Interview, supra note
30.
194. Norvell & Katz, supra note I (finding that this problem is still in effect as the Brazilian business
magazine Exame reported recently that the cost of an average 486-DX2 with a color monitor, two floppy disk
drives and a 210 MB hard drive dropped 29% over the past two years to $2,113). This is still well above the
price for the same product in the United States. Id.
195. See supra notes 162-166 and accompanying text (explaining that the end result of isolating Brazil's
market from superior foreign goods resulted in the Brazilian consumer being forced to choose only from higher
priced, and often inferior, nationally manufactured products).
196. See . P. Farber, Computer Fever, U.SJLATIrTRADE, Sept. 1994, at 11.
197. PC Software Industry Lost $8.08 Billion to Pirates in 1994, supra note 7.
198. Angus Foster, Peso Crisis Casts Shadow Over Brazilian Economy, FIN. TIMEs LONDON, Jan. 14,
1995, at p.78 (describing Brazil as unique from Mexico as a result of Cardoso instituting measures to eradicate
market restrictions which had historically been an integral part of the Brazilian market); Arnaldo Cesar, Brazil-
Economy; Stock Market Fall Fails to Dampen Enthusiasm, INTER PRESS RE.LEASE; Jan. 16, 1995
(distinguishing the Mexican peso devaluation and resulting market collapse in Mexico to the strong and vibrant
Brazilian market); see Gustavo Lombo, Money & Investing.- World Markets Review, FORBES, Jan. 16, 1995,
at 110 (describing the Cardoso Administration as dedicated to market reforms); Brazil's Cardoso To Sign
Order Easing Inports, REUTERS, LTD., Feb. 15, 1995; Contra, Brazilian Decree Gives Preference to Locally
Produced Computers, I I Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 428 (Mar. 16,1994) (reporting that the Brazilian government,
on March 2, 1994, issued a new decree that further closed market access to foreign telecommunications
companies and that U.S. Secretary of Commerce, Ron Brown, sent a letter of protest about the new measure
to Brazilian Minister of Science and Technology, Jose Vargas, stating that this recent action was a step
backward to the world trend of opening technology markets).
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Cardoso was Brazil's finance minister. In addition to establishing the new cur-
rency program that reduced monthly inflation from seventy percent down to
between one and three percent,1 he began lowering import barriers for foreign
goods'° In October of 1994 alone, tariffs on over 13,000 products were reduced
twenty to thirty-five percent'3 Brazil in 1994, imported US$32.1 billion, a
twenty-six percent increase from 1993.2"This trend of lowering import taxes and
increasing imports is a continuing process throughout the Cardoso presidency.3
The effect the Cardoso Administration's trade policy will have on the
computer software market is two-fold. First, lowered import taxes on foreign
manufactured software means those products' prices will not reflect artificial
costs imposed by the Brazilian government, making the product economically
unattractive to the consumer. This will increase the Brazilian consumer's
receptivity to foreign software. Second, where prices for software applications de-
crease, the revenue loss attributable to software piracy also decreases. When the
superior foreign software becomes price competitive with the lower-priced,
(though inferior) local software, the consumer purchases the foreign product
rather than pirating it?35
To continue increased trade growth, the Cardoso Administration recognizes
it must provide protection against local illegal reproduction of the imported
goods? ' 6 Protecting the intellectual property of imported goods provides the in-
centive through which greater trade and economic prosperity will continue.?'
7
Because investors tend to be adverse to unreasonable or excessive risk absent
199. See Mac Margolis, Global Markets in Turmoil; Brazil; Similarities Have Investors Worried, L.A.
Tims, Jan. 14. 1995, at 1.
200. James Bruce, Brazilian Mandate; Fernando Henrique Cardoso Wins the Presidency, and With it
an Opportunity to Transform the Giant of South America, U.SJLAlN TRADE, Nov. 1995, at 14.
201. Trade Roundup: Brazil-Tariffs Cut, U.SJLArIN TRADE, Nov. 1994, at 21 (reporting that the
Brazilian government announced it was lowering import duties on 13,000 products). Lowering the tariffs
barriergreatly increased imports to Brazil, resulting in one of Brazil's biggest air cargo overflows in its history.
James Bruce, Brazil: Clipped Wings, U.SJLATIN TRADE, Jan. 1995, at 10. Shipments were taking 20 days to
clear customs and cargo overflowed warehouses. Id. This problem did produce reforms in the transportation
of cargo. Id. Air cargo traffic from the United States to Brazil has jumped 50% since the introduction of the
Real Plan on July 1, 1994. Trade Roundup: Brazil-Booming Demand, U.SJLATIN TRADE, Feb. 1995, at 19.
But see Brazil: Boom-Busting, U.SJLA'rN TRADE, May 1995, at 12 (reporting that in May 1995, a 70% tariff
was imposed on automobiles and several other consumer goods).
202. Trade Roundup: Brazil-Trade Boom, U.SJLArTN TRADE, Mar. 1995, at 20.
203. Cf. Id.
204. SPA Press Release, Mar. 28, 1994, supra note 173 (stating that while the decrease in the average
retail price for applications actually increased the piracy rate, sales increased by 37%). Thus revenue loss from
the price decrease becomes less as it is set off against the increase in sales. Id.
205. Cf. Id.
206. 59 Fed. Reg. No. 42 (1994) (reporting that the U.S. relaxed USTR trade sanctions after Brazil stated
it would undertake all appropriate measures to strengthen intellectual property rights); but see Steinhardt
Interview 9111195, supra note 34 (stating that the Cardoso Administration and specific Senators do realize the
importance of increasing protection for intellectual property rights though it is a difficult goal to achieve).
207. Doane, supra note 48, at 469-470.
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adequate intellectual property protection, many investors may shift their invest-
ments from intellectual property-dependent projects to less productive, albeit less
risky, investmente
The Cardoso Administration made great strides towards decreasing the risks
of investing in intellectual property-dependent activities.29 It introduced signi-
ficant legislation to the Brazilian Congress requiring heightened protection of
patent, trademark, copyright, and trade-secret rights.210 More importantly, the
Cardoso Administration reduced barriers to international access to the Brazilian
markets.2 n
2. The New "Real"
The cornerstone of Brazil's economic resurgence, both in the international
and national marketplace, was the establishment of the new Brazilian
currency-the "Real."212 Beginning on July 1, 1994, the Brazilian government
removed 1200 metric tons of inflated cruzeiros reais from circulation, replacing
them with 6.66 billion Real backed by US$40 billion of reserves.Y13
208. Doane, supra note 48, at 469-470.
209. Brazil: StrongerIPRights on the Way, CROSSBORDERMoNrrioR, Mar. 16, 1994 (reporting that for
Brazil to avoid U.S. trade sanctions, the Brazilian government must improve copyright legislation and
enforcement). Furthermore, Brazil must liberalize its rules for marketing computer software which would also
result in lower taxes for the item. Id. Brazilian Congress to Weigh Law Strengthening CD Rental Protections,
12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 307, Feb. 15, 1995 (finding that the Brazilian Congress is considering passage of
new laws that would strengthen a person's ability to copy CD-ROMs without the permission of the author).
Presently CD rental stores never ask for the author's permission when renting a CD-ROM to a customer. Id.
The new law would forbid disk renters to rent any CD-ROM without a sticker saying the creator and the
Brazilian Association of Software Companies have approved the rental. Id.
210. Steinhardt Interview 9/11195, supra note 34 (stating that Brazil eradicated recently a tax imposed
upon foreign manufactured software); see infra notes 232-244 and accompanying text (discussing new and
proposed legislation for the protection of computer software).
211. Brooke, supra note 2 (reporting that Brazil, to encourage trade in legal software, is planning to
abolish two restrictions on imports-registration of foreign software with the government and a tax on foreign
exchange transfers for purchases of software from overseas); James Bruce, Brazil Programmers Seek Niche
in Open Market, J. CoM., Sept. 8, 1994, at 6 (stating that the Brazilian software sector is seeking to establish
a niche in export markets for domestically developed software as the Brazilian Government opens its
previously restricted market to foreign software products).
212. See 60 Fed Reg. 3394 (1995) (emphasizing that the U.S. Department of Commerce has termed
Brazil a "Big Emerging Market" (BEM)). A BEM is a country having a large geography, significant
populations, and considerable markets for a wide range of products. Id. Virtually all BEMs have strong rates
of growth or hold promise for future economic expansion and that most of these countries are of major political
importance within their regions; "moreover, they are regional economic drivers-their growth will engender
further expansion in neighboring markets." Id. Lenilson Ferreira, Brazil is Magnets fornAmerican Investment,
JAPAN ECON., NEwswnmE Feb. 16, 1995 (describing the new economic reality of Brazil as the result of the Real
Plan).
213. Bruce, Score One For Brazil, U.SJLATN TRADE, Sept. 1994, at 10 (explaining that the new
currency program which took affect on July 1, 1994 promptly reduced inflation from 48% in June to 6.08%
in July, with inflation now hovering from 1-2% monthly).
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The Real was introduced at R$1.08 to the dollar.21 4 Inflation previously
reaching fifty to seventy percent now fluctuates between one and three percent
monthly.2 5 Many prices for goods actually decreased2 6 and credit card sales, in
June alone, jumped over fifty percent.217
The reduction in monthly inflation coupled with predictable economic
indicators creates a perception of economic stability injecting needed confidence
into Brazil's consumers.2 8 Credit card use among Brazilian consumers has
jumped markedly since the inception of the Real,219 with major credit card com-
panies predicting Brazil to be their top market well into the next century. 2" The
government, fearful of any negative.repercussions this increase in consumer
credit spending may crete, has implemented new rules requiring all credit card
balances be paid in full each month, as part of their anti-inflation plan.?21
Increased consumer confidence along with such rapid growth in credit card
usage will fuel Brazil's already growing computer software markets.222 As the
Cardoso Administration gradually eliminates import taxes, duties, and tariffs, the
Real continues to provide the means to purchase the influx of foreign software.
As a result, purchasing illegally reproduced copies will become less attractive.=
As the rate of piracy progressively lowers, consumers will come to see the
benefits of buying the original software product as opposed to purchasing the
214. 1d.; but see Currency Band Widens, U.S.JLATIN TRADE, Aug, 1995, at 19 (stating that Brazil is
allowing the Real to float on a band of between 0.91-0.99, but economists fear a devaluation late in 1995).
215. Bruce, supra note 213, at 76.
216. Bruce, supra note 213 (stating that prices of two dietary staples, black beans and rice, dropped
12-42% and 8.89% respectively and prices for drinks and sweets fell by 18.39%, cleaning products by 16.15%.
and eggs by 16.04%, and quoting Fundaslo Getulio Vargas and research director Jose Francisco Filho as
stating that there is still a lot of fat to bum from prices).
217. Jaochim Bamrud, Credit Card Samba; Spurred by a Surge in Brazil, U.S. Credit and Debit Card
Companies are Expecting Strong Growih in Latin America This Year, U.SJLATIN TRADF, Jan. 1995, at 30.
218. Ian Katz, Banking on Home Computers, U.SAJ.ATIN TRADE, Aug. 1995, at 24 (citing Brazilian bank
UNIBANCO's recognition that "the Real Plan stabilized the currency and lowered inflation, encouraging
Brazilians to go on a spending binge"); Ian Katz, Bradlian Boom, U.SJ.ATINTRADE, Aug. 1995, at 70 (stating
that Brazil's ground, sea, and air transportation system is seeing unprecedented traffic as a result of a "domestic
spending boom, a record soybean crop and skyrocketing trade within the MERCOSUR trade pact").
219. Bamriud, supra note 217.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Katz, supra note 218 (stating that the Real Plan has allowed Brazilians to plan monthly budgets
which translates into consumers who will now make more careful purchasing decisions thus, leading Brazilian
consumers towards foreign manufactured software which, after areduction in import taxes, is price competitive
with domestic products). The increased buying power which credit allows will make the more expensive
foreign manufactured software more readily accessible to those consumers who, without the credit, were unable
to purchase the higher priced, though superior, software product. Id.
223. SPA Press Release, Mar. 28, 1994, supra note 173 (deducing that in those markets where software
prices have decreased total revenues have increased).
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pirated version.3 4 The superior nature of "legitimate" software exists in the
method of manufacturer support, documentation, as well as acquiring updates or
corrections of the software from the manufacturer.32 Clearly, Brazilian firms that
do pirate software cannot offer the full-range of services available from the
original software publisher3m
IV. THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT OF BRAZILIAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION
There is no "world copyright law."22 However, under the principal of
national treatment, international conventions and treaties obligate countries to ex-
tend their own intellectual property laws to members of reciprocating countries m
Under this principle of national treatment, a U.S. national will receive the same
treatment under the law of the foreign country as the foreign country affords to
its own nationals. 29 However, this national treatment comes under the host
country's domestic law, not under international law.3 0 In the case of Brazil, ex-
224. Rodolfo Lucena, "'Windows 95' Pirata Ja Esta no Brasil," FOLHAWEB, World Wide Web Site-
http://www.embratel.net.brfinfoservlagfolhainformatreporta.htm (trans. Ana Paula Rago Villi) [hereinafter
Lucena] (discussing the lack of quality in the pirated version). The pirated version brings no guarantees of
quality with it and might include a computer virus which could damage any existing applications on the
computer. Id. The worst drawback to purchasing a pirated version is the lack of product support because to get
services from Microsoft the purchaser must provide proof that the software is indeed the property of the user
with a registered number. Id. Other recognized benefits of purchasing the legal software are that the pirated
software might not even work or the disks purchased may be completely blank without any manufacturer to
turn to for a correct copy. Id.
225. Id.
226. See Athey, supra note 52, at 32 (writing that a potential solution to software piracy is utilizing
educational techniques to inform consumers of the benefits that the legal purchasing of software provides).
227. HARRYHENN, HENNONCOPYRIGHTLAw:APRACTrIONER'S GuIDE423 (3d ed. 1991) (stating that
while most nations have enacted copyright laws, they are not uniform and have no extraterritorial effect; these
foreign laws, like U.S. statutes and case law, are subject to frequent changes).
228. GOLDsTmN, supra note 140, at 676. To obtain relief against the illegal and unauthorized use of
one's creation in another country, U.S. copyright owners must establish that their work is entitled to copyright
protection in that country and that they own the copyright in that country. Id. Establishing eligibility for
protection under the copyright law of a foreign country will usually depend upon compliance with one of four
conditions. Id.
First, the author of the work must show he is a national or domiciliary of the foreigti country.
Second, the author of the work in a national or domiciliary of a country with which the foreign
country has established copyright relations through a multilateral or bilateral treaty or through
proclamation. Third, the work was first published in the foreign country. Or fourth, the work was
first published in a country with which the foreign country has established copyright relations.
Id.
229. GOLDSTErN, supra note 140, at §16.2.
230. KuTrE, supra note 149, at 11-38 (outlining that a foreign holder of an intellectual property will
receive no more favorable treatment than that which the foreign country grants its own citizens). See GASAWAY
& WIANT, supra note 29. at 157-79 (1994).
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temal pressures have often dictated the type of national treatment Brazil would
accord to intellectual property of foreigners?31
A. Pending Changes to the 1987 Software Law
The Executive Branch of Brazil, in May of 1991, sent to the Brazilian
Congress a new bill that would revamp the 1987 Software Law.?32 Since its
inception, the bill has undergone vast amendments which have drastically
changed its original format. 233 However, there are many original elements of the
bill still contained in the legislation.23 Regardless of any changes to the 1987
Software Law, this new legislation still has not passed formally into law.
The bill would officially eradicate the test of similars and market reserve
from the legislation3 5 The new text proposes to eliminate the need to enroll the
foreign manufactured software with the INPI as a requisite to marketing in
Brazil. 6 Also struck from the 1987 Software Law by the newly proposed legis-
lation will be the software distribution market reserve.37 Any software manu-
facturer may be able to distribute software independently from the origin of its
capital or of its controlling shareholders.3 8 The new legislation also authorizes
end-users in Brazil the right to purchase software in any quantities and to import
directly from any country. 39 Also included within this proposed legislation is the
application of more flexible criteria for determining the payment due to foreign
software property holders.m
Notably, under the new legislation, the intellectual property protection
chapter of the law remains essentially unaltered, 241 thereby creating a tension
between the international computer industry and Brazil. 42 The proposed law
mandates the continued application of the twenty-five year protection period for
231. Seesupra notes 61-115 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. imposition of trade sanctions
to persuade Brazil into legislating stronger national support for computer software).
232. Brazilian House of Representatives Legislative Bill No. 997 of 1991 (by the Executive Branch)
Message No. 229191 [hereinafter Bill No. 997]. See Fischer. The Software Law, supra note 78, at 10.
233. Steinhardt Interview 9/11195, supra note 34.
234. Id.
235. Fischer, The Software Law, supra note 78, at 10.
236. Ricardo Barretto Ferreira da Silva & Cristina Esperante Myrrha, Brief Updating on the Changing
Legal Environment Related to the Brazilian Computer Industry and Telecommunications, INFORMATIVO
A.B.D.L. Oct. 1991, at 1, 3.
237. Id. at 3
238. Id.
239. Id. at 3-4.
240. Id. at 4.
241. Fischer. The Software Law, supra note 78, at 10; but see 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 307, Feb. 15.
1995, supra note 209 (reporting that the Brazilian Congress is set to discuss a new draft law that would
expressly outlaw the rental of compact discs without the owners permission).
242. Steinhardt Interview 1/11/95, supra note 3.
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software.243 However, the twenty-five year protection fails to satisfy Brazil's
obligation under the GATrTRIPs provisions.4
B. GATT/TRIPs Impact
From its inception, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAT) 2 45
has been concerned mainly with the reduction of all trade and tariff barriers and
any other conceivable obstacle to equitable international competition.24 6 The
United States asserts that inadequate intellectual property protection leads to trade
distortions and that the impairment of concessions due to intellectual property
piracy amounts to a non-tariff trade barrier.2 47
GATT acts as more than a single treaty and involves a complex set of over
100 agreements revised on a periodic basis.2 48 Concerted efforts by the U.S.
government and its business community placed international intellectual property
rights on the negotiating agenda for the Uruguay Round of Negotiations of the
GAIT. 2 49 Concern for the international protection of intellectual property rights
243. Bill No. 997, supra note 232, at ch. II, art. 3.
244. See infra notes 245-264 and accompanying text.
245. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat. (5), (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700,4 Bevans 639,
55-61 U.N.T.S. (concluded at Geneva, October 30, 1947; entered into force January 1, 1948) [hereinafter
GA'rTT.
246. Gabriel E. Larrea Richerand, GATr, Intellectual Property Rights and the Developing Countries,
25 CoPYGHT BuLL. 4.4 (1991); see GAIT supra note 245, at Preface.
247. See U.S. Framework Proposal to GATConcerning Intellectual Property Rights, 4 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1371, Nov. 4, 1987 (proposing measures to reduce impediments to legitimate trade in goods and
services by increasing enforcement procedures and economic deterrents); see also State Department Program
Examines "GA Tfand Intellectual Propenty" 31 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHTJ. (BNA) 497, Apr. 10, 1986
(presenting a myriad of views regarding the procedures by which the United States could improve intellectual
property protection in foreign markets).
248. MARKW. JANiS, AN IRODUCIONTO INTEwRATONAL LAW283 (1993). On Ddcember 8,1994,
U.S. President Clinton signed into Law legislation implementing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
President Signs GATT Bill and IP Owners Ponder Impact of Changes, 49 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA) 129, Dec. 8, 1994.
249. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Punta del Este, reprinted in BASIn INSTRume
Am)nSmcxmm Docum~m 19,25 (33d Supp. 1986). United States Trade Representative (USTR) Ambassador
Mickey Kantor stated, regarding the importance of intellectual property to the US. government:
One of my principal responsibilities as USTR is to open foreign markets and break down barriers
to U.S. manufactured goods, agricultural products, and services. This includes pursuing the strong
protection of U.S. intellectual property, so important to our high technology industries. When all
is said and done, opening foreign markets is our main objective in the Uruguay Round; it is the
impetus, from our standpoint. for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFrA); it will be
a principal focus of our efforts with respect to Japan and China, as well as in other nations around
the world....
Consequently, we need to use every tool at our disposal multilaterally where possible, and
bilaterally where necessary, to make sure that other markets are comparably open to our own.
Doane, supra note 48, at 467-68 (quoting testimony of Ambassador Kantor, USTR, before the Senate
Committee on Finance Mar. 9, 1993 (on file with The American University Journal of International Law and
Policy)).
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was also expressed by Japan and Western Europe.250 On December 15, 1993, the
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations under the GATT concluded with the imple-
mentation of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). 251
The TRIPs component of the GATIr mandates the establishment of sub-
stantive standards for intellectual property protection and requires mechanisms
for the enforcement of rigfits.252 To this end, TRIPs employ the standard encom-
passed within the Berne Convention of September 9, 1886, For The Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works2 3 as the method for the protection of computer
programs.25 Article 10 of the TRIPs Agreement states that "[c]omputer
programs, whether in source or object code, shall be protected as literary works
under the Berne Convention (1971)." 25
The Berne Convention aims to achieve a universal system of protection by
combining two principal methods.6 The Convention creates certain minimum
standards of copyright law which must be followed by member states, while also
requiring the principle of national treatment.? This precludes any member state
from maintaining formalities or registration requirements in its copyright law
having the effect of excluding states from protection against the illegal repro-
duction of their work or providing lesser protection than to nationals.5 Yet, the
Berne Convention does not refer specifically to computer programs, or any other
250. Richerand, supra note 246, at 6 (stating that the United States, together with the Western European
countries and especially Japan, were deeply concerned by the protection of intellectual rights and were engaged
in efforts to raise the level of international protection).
251. GATT, supra note 245, at Part II; Annex IC-Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter TRIPs] (implementing into
the GATT the international protection ofintellectual property); Uruguay RowdAgreement is Reached: Clinton
Notifies Congress Under Fast Track, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2103, Dec. 15, 1993 (reporting that after seven
years of negotiations and two postponements, the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations was finally
concluded with delegates by acclamation approving the Draft Final Act).
252. Doane, supra note 48, at 468. TRIPs include specific civil procedure provisions for enforcement
that require timely written notice to defendants, the opportunity to representation by legal counsel, the
opportunity to present evidence and the protection of confidential information. TRIPs, supra note 251, at art.
42. TRIPs require the parties to provide injunctive relief andfor damages, including the possibility of attorneys
fees or destruction of infinging goods for infringement. Id. at art. 44,45, 46. TRIPs requirejudicial authority
to order provisional measures to prevent infringement and to preserve relevant evidence. Id. at art. 50.
Provisional measures are only applied if the plaintiff presents a "sufficient degree of certainty" of title to the
intellectual property and of infringement and the defendant is granted the opportunity to be heard regarding
the measures. Id at art. 50(3). The plaintiffimust pay the defendant compensation if the provisional measures
are revoked. Id. at art. 50(7).
253. Berne, supra note 92, arts. 1-21.
254. TRIPs, supra note 251, arts. 9-10 (requiring compliance with Articles 1-21 and the Appendix of
Berne).
255. Id.
256. Schuz, supra note 93, at 115.
257. 1d; see also GoTnsmTIN, supra note 140 (defining the principle of national treatment as providing
the same treatment to authors from other states as it confers to its own nationals).
258. Schuz, supra note 93, at 115.
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computer related technology. Thus, the question of whether Berne protects com-
puter software is answered definitively by the TRIPs component of the GA1T.259
The TRIPs component's mandate requiring the protection of computer soft-
ware as a literary work under the Berne Convention accomplishes two important
goals. First, it applies copyright law to the international protection of computer
software.m Second, it obliges parties to protect computer software for the life of
the author plus fifty years.61 To find that the Brazilian Software Law of 1987
meets the standards set forth under the TRIPs component of the GATT, to which
Brazil is a signatory member, would be a strained interpretation. The 1987 Soft-
ware Law accords merely twenty-five years of protection to computer software. 2
Brazil states, through this legislation, that it views computer software as a work
of applied art. It is difficult to find merit within this argument because the
artistic value of software is intertwined within its industrial nature. Thus, to sepa-
rate the two in order to accord a lesser standard of protection fails logically?"
C. Current U.S. Efforts
The United States imposed trade sanctions against Brazil on November 13,
1987, as a result of Brazil's failure to successfully legislate for the stronger pro-
tection of intellectual property rights.O5 In response, Brazil softened its hardline
position on intellectual property and the Brazilian Congress legislated suc-
cessfully a stricter software copyright law.m Yet, U.S. attention turned to Brazil
once again in 1993 when the United States Trade Representative placed Brazil on
its priority watch list for intellectual property violations.26
259. Id.
260. Berne, supra note 92, art. 2.
261. M4 art. 7; but see Brazilian Law No. 7646 of Dec. 18, 1987, supra note 8, Titell, art. 3 (presenting
the dilemma posed by the Brazilian government's strained interpretation of computer software as applied works
of art).
262. Brazilian Law No. 7646 of Dec. 18, 1987, supra note 8, Title H, art. 3.
263. See supra note 151 (discussing that under Brazilian law applied art works are protected only if their
artistic value is disassociable from their industrial nature). It is difficult to fit computer programs into this
category. Id.
264. Casella, supra note 19, at BR-8. But see, 2 Li. Ktrrr N, CoMPuTER SOFrWARE: PROTEcrtoN,
LTADILrTY, LAw, FoRms 11-45-11-46 (1992) (finding that each country can decide for itself whether or not a
computer program on magnetic media qualifies for protection). In the case of Microsoft's WINDOWS, the
artistic nature of the interface allows its industrial nature to be exploited. Steinhardt Interview 1/11195, supra
note 3.
265. See supra notes 61-115 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. influence behind Brazil's
passage of the 1987 Software Law)
266. See supra notes 61-115 and accompanying text.
267. 58 Fed. Reg. 31788 (1993) (stating that the USTR has initiated an investigation under Section
302(b)(2)(A) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (The Trade Act) with respect to certain acts, policies and
practices of the Government of the Republic of Brazil that deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual
property rights).
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Initially, Brazil did not derogate from its position that the 1987 Software Law
was more than adequate for the protection of computer software from piracy.26
U.S. diplomatic relations eventually persuaded Brazil to see the possible flaws in
its existing legislation.? 9 Far from passing new legislation, Brazil did agree to
investigate the problem.2 70
In the context of five rounds of discussions which occurred during the
USTR's 1993 investigation into Brazil's intellectual property protection, 27' Brazil
and the United States reached an agreement in February 1994.2 During these
diplomatic meetings the Brazilian delegation indicated that it would, in
consideration of the USTR stopping its investigation, begin domestic reforms to
improve both intellectual property protection and increase market access for pro-
ducts relying on the protection of intellectual property.273 Also, since the initiation
of the USTR investigation, the TRIPs portion of GATT that had been approved
provided even greater impetus for Brazil to enact legislation that would comport
its laws with international agreements.2 74
Brazil, by entering into this agreement with the United States, agreed to
accelerate the legislation process to establish new laws to comply with the
GAIT/TRIPs standards for protection. 27s As a result of the agreement, the USTR
suspended investigatory action under Section 304 of the Trade Act of 197476
The USTR stated as follows:
The USTR has made a positive determination pursuant to
§304(a)(l)(A)(ii) [of the Trade Act of 1974]. Since the Government of
Brazil has undertaken measures to significantly improve the protection
and enforcement of intellectual property rights and market access for per-
268. Cf. id. (examining the USTR's action here and Brazil's subsequent inaction even following the
February 1994 agreement with the United States, leads one to conclude that Brazil believes its 1987 Software
Law and other intellectual property laws are more than adequate for international purposes).
269. Cf. 59 Fed. Reg. 10224 (1994) (proposed Mar. 3, 1994) (finding that the United States decided to
grant Brazil an extension of time in which to revamp its current, though lacking, intellectual property
legislation because the United States felt it was persuading Brazil into the hoped for act).
270. See supra notes 232-244 and accompanying text (explaining the new draft legislation for The 1987
Software Law). The Brazilian Congress already had new legislation awaiting passage that would amend the
1987 Software Law. Id.
271. China, Turkey, India, Brazil Faulted For Intellectual Property Inaction, supra note 19 (reporting
that Brazil, as of February 15, 1995, had failed to meet deadlines to improve its copyright regime based on a
February 1994 agreement with the United States).
272. 59 Fed. Reg. 10224 (1994) (proposed Mar. 3, 1994).
273. Id.; 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 726, May, 5, 1993, supra note 13 ("examining recent improvements,
the USTR announced that Brazil has introduced amendments to a pending law on industrial property,
intensified enforcement efforts on its trademark and copyrights law, and has issued new technology transfer
regulations').
274. Fischer Interview, supra note 30; Steinhardt Interview 1/11195, supra note 3.
275. Steindhardt Interview 1/11195, supra note 3.
276. See supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text (discussing the Super 301 activity where the
President of the United States' and USTR's authority under such Act is granted).
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sons relying on intellectual property rights and will take additional steps
in the future in connection with its intention to implement the results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral trade negotiations including the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Rights, the USTR
has decided to terminate this investigation and monitor implementation
of these measures under §306(a)(2) [of the Trade Act of 1974].
In addition, the USTR has decided to revoke the government of Brazil's
identification as a priority foreign country under § 182 of the Trade Act. Brazil
agreed to comply with its commitments under the February 1994 understanding
by June 1994 but has failed to meet this deadline while, surprisingly, no action
was taken by the United States.2
Brazil has continued to debate improved legislation while continuing to
violate GATT27 In April 1995, the USTR made its annual announcements of
what countries would be chosen for concentrated efforts to change their intel-
lectual property activities toward U.S. products 9 Brazil was placed on an"
intermediary watch list. ° The USTR felt, judging from its failure to take a
stringent stance towards Brazil, that the country was making excellent strides
towards strengthening its protection of intellectual property rights and no further
U.S. action was necessary.?1
Concern with Brazil's intellectual property protection regime is not limited
to merely U.S. interests. For example, the MERCOSUR customs union 2 is still
at an impasse on the question of intellectual property rights.?3 Surprisingly, the
most ardent supporter of strict intellectual property rights in that context is the
country of Brazil. +
277. China, Turkey, India, Brazil Faulted For Intellectual Property Inaction, supra note 19.
278. Id. (announcing Brazil has failed to improve its copyright regime within the time limit agreed upon
in a February 1994 memo of understanding with the United States). See supra notes 245-264 and accom-
panying text (discussing Brazil's violation of GATT).
279. US. Warns Japan and Others on Parent Piracy, N.Y.TIMES, Apr. 30, 1995, at § I, p.1 5 (reporting
that the Clinton Administration would subject Brazil to special reviews "to insure that pressure is maintained
on these countries for progress" in the implementation of stronger intellectual property rights).
280. Id.
281. USTR Announcement and Fact Sheets on Decision Affecting Foreign Govenument Procurement,
Intellectual Property Protection, and U.S.-Japan Supercomputer Pact, II Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 722, May
4, 1994 (stating that Brazil has made significant progress in resolving long-standing problems with their
intellectual property protection regime). Cf. id.; See also Steinhardt Interview 9/11/95, supra note 34.
282. Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay-United States-Uruguay: Agreement Concerning a Council on Trade
andInvestment, reprinted in, 30 I.L.M. 1034 (1991) (developing international trade and investment among the
parties through the creation of a South Common Market (Merocur)).
283. Trademark Piracy Tops MERCOSUR Nations'Agenda, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 305, Feb. 15,
1995 (stating that a primary source of the dissatisfaction between the MERCOSUR member states stems from
trademark violations). Ironically, Brazil is the principal victim of the violations. Id.
284. Id. (stating that many popular Brazilian trademarks have been registered in MERCOSUR member
countries by entities other than the rightful owner). Once the Brazilian owner of the trademark enters the other
country, it finds it is unable to use its trademark because it has already been registered. Id.
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As of the date of this comment's submission for publication, the Brazilian
Congress is in the process of reviewing new legislation to broaden and strengthen
the 1987 Software Law.285 The new proposed legislation would, most notably,
result in Brazil's acceptance of a fifty year period of protection for software to
comply with GATT/TRIPs standards.
U.S. actions to curtail the illegal reproduction of computer software are not
limited to the diplomatic arena. 5 The Business Software Alliance's Latin Ameri-
can division routinely conducts surprise raids on companies suspected of using
pirated versions of computer software in Brazil and throughout Latin America.2 7
These raids are conducted in association with state police? 8 Jeffrey Steinhardt,
corporate counsel for Microsoft, as well as Chair of the BSA's Latin America
Committee, states that these raids have increased community awareness of the
illegality of computer software piracy.2 9 Even more importantly, these raids alert
the Brazilian business community that illegally reproducing computer software
is against the law and violations will be strictly enforced9°
V. CONCLUSION
On August 6, 1993, in a stunning decision by the State of S~o Paulo's lower
court, Microsoft was awarded US$10 million in damages stemming from a
lawsuit against a local Brazilian computer manufacturer for software piracy.?
The Brazilian hardware manufacturer, Prologica, one of the largest in Brazil, was
accused of copying Microsoft's DOS into its new computers.2 2 Prologica
responded to Microsoft's accusations by claiming that the software included in
its computer package was in fact an application that Prologica created
independently and that any similarities were due to the limitation of alternative
forms of expression.293 The Court rejected Prologica's response, since the
evidence showed that Prologica had in fact expended no capital on the
285. Steinhardt Interview 911195, supra note 33.
286. Steinhardt Interview 9111195, supra note 33.
287. U.S. Sofmware Companies Hope Raids in Brazil Will Help Increase Legal Sales of Programs, 7 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 697, May 16, 1990.
288. Steinhardt Interview 9/11/95, supra note 33.
289. Steinhardt Interview 9/11/95, supra note 33. The BSA also initiates litigation in many countries
around the world in defense of its members proprietary rights in their creations. Id. Recently, in a January 1995
decision by the Court of Appeals of the State of Sio Paulo. a BSA victory was affirmed. Sa Paulo, Brazil,
CONTRA LA PIATERIA, Mar. 1995, at p.1 (stating that this is the Latin America Committee of the BSA's
monthly newsletter). The Court of Appeals decision represented the first civil appellate decision in Brazil
regarding computer software. Id.
290. Steinhardt Interview 911195, supra note 33.
291. Fischer, supra note 78, at II.
292. Fischer supra note 78, at 11.
293. Fischer, supra note 78, at 11.
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development of its program.29 4 This judgment was the largest ever awarded a
foreign software manufacturer for piracy by a Brazilian Court. Yet, the piracy
problem in Brazil continues to exist outside the reach of the Brazilian judiciary. 95
In August 1995, Microsoft introduced its new operating system Windows 95.
Within days of the official unveiling, illegal copies of the system were being sold
in Brazilian computer markets? 6 The only difference between the illegal and
legal copies, apart from the product support provided by Microsoft, was the
price. 97 A legally manufactured Portuguese version of Windows 95 sells for
R$230 while a pirated version, in Portuguese, sells for a mere R$52. In the United
States, the English version of the program sells for around US$100.
Brazil is one of the world's largest computer markets with predictions that its
growth may come to equal, if not far surpass, that of many Asian countries. 98
While this expansion in the computer industry requires a similar increase in
software application, growth in the corollary software market depends uniquely
on strong protection of the intellectual property rights in software. In Brazil, the
1987 Software Law acts to promote these goals by providing criminal penalties
as well as fines for any violation of the law. 99 The Brazilian Congress is also
examining the reformulation of the 1987 Software Law to bring it into parity with
GATT3? °
Led by newly elected President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Brazil is
experiencing a rebirth in its political, economic and social institutions. President
Cardoso's economic stabilization plan has brought inflation within reasonable
limits, stabilized prices and increased international trade?0  Brazil's forward
momentum will require new technologies, improved processes and more efficient
methods to sustain such historical growth.3 Computer software provides the
necessary means to these ends. It then becomes important to create incentives to
bring these means to Brazil while reducing, as far as possible, the risks of
damaging one's proprietary rights in the product. Brazil currently is not reducing,
as reasonably possible, the risks of marketing computer software within its
294. Fischer, supra note 79, at 11.
295. See supra notes 157-290 and accompanying text (discussing the present Brazilian computer market
and the continuing high percentage of computer software illegally reproduced).
296. Lucena, supra note 224. More surprising, three days after Microsoft's official release, copies were
being sold in China for only US$2.50. Id.
297. Lucena, supra note 227.
298. See Norvell & Katz, supra note 1, at 73-76; see Brooke, supra note 2.
299. Brazilian Law No. 7646 of Dec. 18, 1987, supra note 8, Title VII.
300. See supra notes 232-244 and accompanying text (discussing current Brazilian efforts to amend the
1987 Software Law).
301. See supra notes 188-226.
302. See supra notes 19-60 and accompanying text (explaining that Brazil's historical conceptualization
of intellectual property rights, specifically towards computer software, must alter in order to provide the
foundation upon which future growth may be built).
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borders.303 It is imperative for Brazil to upgrade the period of protection for
software while alone providing more vigorous protection of software copyright.
Absent effective protection of software's proprietary rights, the incentive to
market one's software within Brazilian borders decreases greatly.
Theodore G. Bryant*
303. See supra notes 245-264 and accompanying text (reviewing Brazil's continued violation of its
obligations under the TRIPs provisions of the GAIT to protect computer software for a term of 50 years per
the Berne Convention). Brazil also fails in policing andjudicially enforcing computer software piracy laws
though recent judicial decisions do indicate a shift from previous inaction. Id.
* To my lovely wife Ana Paula, whose dedication, compassion, and understanding made this
comment possible.
